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THE EVOLVING RELATIONS OF JAPAN AND INDIA

by

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THE EVOLVING RELATIONS OF JAPAN AND INDIA

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ABSTRACT

At the beginning of the 21st century, Japan and India started to build their bilateral relationship. This growth happened despite Japan having cut off almost all relations with India two years previously after India's nuclear weapons test and the previous minimal nature of the relationship. The relationship has grown from almost nothing to include annual meetings of the prime ministers, a free trade agreement, maritime security cooperation, and annual military exercises. This thesis looks at an array of factors within great power dynamics, multilateral and bilateral institutions, and domestic politics to determine the underlying cause behind Japan's and India's actions to determine the transience or permanence of the relations. It is concluded that balance of power considerations are the primary reason for increased Japan-India interaction. These considerations are influenced by the increasing activism of India and Japan in world affairs and the lack of historical controversies between the two states.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian States
CEPA	Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement
CLB	Cabinet Legislation Bureau
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
COW	Correlates of War Project
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
EAS	East Asia Summit
GDP	gross national product
IT	information technology
JSDF	Japan Self Defense Force
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
ODA	official developmental assistance
PLA	People's Liberation Army (Chinese military)
PPP	purchasing power parity
ReCAAP	Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combatting Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLOC	sea-lines of communication
SSN	attack submarine, nuclear
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USSR	United Soviet Socialist Republic
WWII	World War II

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Since India gained its independence from Britain, and Japan regained sovereignty after World War II (WWII), the two countries maintained cordial but distant relations for most of the twentieth century. In 1998, however, Japan cut off most of its Official Developmental Assistance (ODA) and took other actions against India after the Pokhoran II tests. As the 21st century began, Japan-India relations changed again with increased contact, cooperation, and interaction. In 2000, despite the issues of the prior two years, Prime Minister Mori visited New Delhi and called India and Japan “global partners,” a phrase previously reserved for the United States.¹ With this visit, Mori started to create a relationship that went beyond “the nuclear problem.”² During the meeting between Prime Ministers Mori and Vajpayee, Mori’s goal was to “build a multifaceted cooperative relationship with India in a wide range of fields,” including proliferation, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reforms, economic exchange, security and defense, youth exchanges, and infrastructure improvement.³ Since that visit, minister and flag officer level meetings have tripled, including the first meetings between defense ministers in decades.⁴ Other developments include annual coast guard exercises that began months after Prime Minister Mori’s visit, a signed a joint declaration on security cooperation in 2008, and bilateral naval exercises that have increased in frequency, becoming an annual

¹ Purnendra Jain, “Westward Ho! Japan Eyes India Strategically,” *Japanese Studies* 28, no. 1 (May, 2008): 17, ProQuest (58773079).

² K. V. Kesavan, *India and Japan: Changing Dimensions of Partnership in the Post-Cold War Period*, (Occasional Paper, Observer Research Foundation, May 2010), 9–10, ProQuest (754079921).

³ “Japan-India Summit Meeting (Summary),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, August 23, 2000, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0008/india_s.html.

⁴ “Japan-India Relations (Basic Data),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, November 2012, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/data.html>.

occurrence in 2012.⁵ Japan and India also created the Japan-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), signed in 2011, which is only the third such agreement for India, as well as the most comprehensive.⁶

This thesis addresses a core question arising from these developments: What is driving this rapid shift in Japan-India relations, and will it continue and grow or will relations return to the previous state of benign disinterest?

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

During the last quarter century, the world has undergone many changes, including the end of the Cold War, increasing globalization, and America's War on Terror. At the same time, Asia has been rising in prominence in world affairs, with Japan and India as two of the three strongest countries in the region. In 2012, Japan and India had the third and tenth largest gross domestic product (GDP) in the world, respectively, while China, the other Asian power, had the second largest.⁷ In terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), India and Japan rank third and fourth, behind the United States and China.⁸ A stronger India-Japan defense relationship has the potential of stimulating trade linkages, which could change the economic landscape due to the size of their respective economies.

Beyond economics, Asia is home to the fastest growing military budgets in the world. While the percentage of military budgets for Japan, India, and China has remained

⁵ Dipankar Banerjee Ramesh Thakur, ed., *Emerging Challenges in UN Peacekeeping Operations: An Indo-Japanese Dialogue*, (New Delhi: Samskriti, 2006), xxi; Rupakjyoti Borah, *Japan-India Maritime Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Prospects and Problems* (Gandhinagar, India: Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University, 2012), 7, http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/fellow_report/120315-Rupakjyoti_Borah.pdf; Purnendra Jain, "Japan's Expanding Security Networks: India and Australia," *Indian Journal of Asian Affairs* (June-December 2009): 1, JSTOR (41950493); National Institute for Defense Studies, *East Asian Strategic Review 2013* (Tokyo: NIDS, 2013), 127, <http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/e2013.html>.

⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Ministry of External Affairs of India, *Japan-India Economic Partnership Agreement* (Tokyo: MOFA, 2011), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/india.html>.

⁷ GDP Ranking, World Bank Group, May 7, 2014, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf>.

⁸ GDP Ranking PPP Based, World Bank Group, May 7, 2014, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP_PPP.pdf.

fairly constant in terms of percent GDP from 1989 to 2013, the value of expenditures has risen drastically. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database, India more than doubled its military spending and was usually in the top ten spenders in the world for that quarter century.⁹ SIPRI's information indicates that Japan increased spending by half during the same period and was usually in the top five. These numbers, however, pale in comparison to China, which according to the same source increased its military spending by a factor of ten and rose from the eleventh to the second highest military spender in the world during the same quarter century. Some, like Christopher Hughes, feel that Japan currently has the most technologically sophisticated conventional military in East Asia, although it is limited by imbalances.¹⁰ India and two of its neighbors, Pakistan and China, each possess nuclear weapons. Further increasing military tensions in the region, India and Japan both have border disputes with neighboring countries. With these large and growing militaries and the contentious relations in Asia, a strong Japan-India defense agreement could bring stability or further antagonism, depending on how their neighbors view it.

Democratization in Asia is another possible repercussion if Japan and India form enduring ties. Japan, with its experience during the Meiji restoration and the government formed after WWII, is Asia's oldest democracy. India is Asia's largest democracy with over 1.2 billion people in 2011.¹¹ India and Japan each have influence in the region, and working together they have the potential ability to shape democratization movements. Conversely, a return to low-level contact between them could signal ambivalence toward democratic ideals.

Both Japan and India are seeking to play a greater role in world politics as well. Japan and India, along with Brazil and Germany, have been pushing for reforms in the

⁹ SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, accessed 27 May, 2014, <http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+military+expenditure+database+1988-2013.xlsx>.

¹⁰ Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Re-emergence as a "Normal" Military Power* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 95; Norman D. Levin, Mark Lorell, and Arthur Alexander, *The Wary Warriors: Future Directions in Japanese Security Policies*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), 59.

¹¹ Registrar General & Census Commissioner, *2011 Census* (New Dehli: GPO, 2011), accessed Jun 13, 2014, <http://www.devinfo.live.info/censusinfodashboard/>.

United Nations (UN), including permanent seats on the UNSC for the four countries.¹² India has participated in UN missions for some time, and Japan has increased its involvement over the last decades.¹³ The growing role of Tokyo and New Delhi in world politics is quite visible in Southeast Asia. Japan, while long involved economically in the region, has been increasing its political and military role in the region since the 1970s. Beginning in 1992, India also began to be more involved in Southeast Asia when it adopted its Look East policy. This policy entailed increased interaction with the states in East Asia and the Pacific, with an initial focus on Southeast Asia; moreover, the focus was initially an economic one, but expanded to military and political participation as well.¹⁴ In this context, the global framework could change if a long-term Japan-India security relationship is established.

The United States is also heavily involved in the region and is looking to become more involved with the pivot to Asia. The United States has maintained a long-lasting alliance with Japan and has agreements with other countries in the region, including South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand. The United States has been trying to build stronger ties with India as well. In March 2000, President Bill Clinton travelled to India and lifted economic sanctions placed on India after their nuclear weapons test in 1998; four years later, the United States and India declared a strategic partnership.¹⁵ If Japan and India develop a strong defense relationship, the United States could either be drawn into conflicts or help create stability with the increasing interconnections within Asia.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Relatively few people outside of India and Japan have written much about the Japan-India relationship, and several of those who do are originally from one of these

¹² Jain, "Westward Ho! Japan Eyes India Strategically," 20–21.

¹³ Thakur, ed., *Emerging Challenges in UN Peacekeeping Operations*, 1.

¹⁴ David M. Malone, *Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 15, 202, 223.

¹⁵ Kazutoshi Tamari, "Explaining the Similarity: Comparative Analysis of Japan and America's India Policy," in *India-Japan Relations in Emerging Asia*, ed. Takenori Horimoto and Lalima Varma (New Delhi: Manohar, 2013), 160.

countries. Within India and Japan, however, the field is somewhat wider. The closest approximation to camps about what has caused the recent increased interaction between India and Japan are those in India, those in Japan, and those from the English-speaking world of England, Australia, and the United States. These groups tend to agree over what has driven Japan and India together as a whole, but seem to disagree over the relative importance of these drivers, the most common being the rise of China, U.S. influence, economic factors, nuclear proliferation, Japan and India's greater involvement and importance in world and regional affairs, and maritime security.

Those from the English-speaking world have focused on China, America, economics, and nuclear weapons. Each of them has cited China's rise and a shared desire to avoid falling under a Chinese hegemonic shadow as driving Japan-India security cooperation. For example, Brewster states, "China looms large in the relationship" due to "mutual perceptions of a 'China threat.'"¹⁶ Similarly, Pant wrote: "The rise of China is a major factor in the evolution of the Indo-Japanese ties."¹⁷

This group has also tended to focus on America's encouragement of the growing ties. Brewster and Pant both describe American influence within Japan and India as equal to the rise of China in stimulating Japan-India relations.¹⁸ Green also argues that the United States plays a central role, as Japan's movements have seemed to follow America's and India's often involve the U.S. when conducting exercises with Japan.¹⁹

These analysts also see more than one issue that is getting in the way of stronger ties. The first problem that could hinder the growing Japan-India partnership is a lack of economic linkages. In 2009, Roehrig thought that both India and Japan's strong economic ties with China could overshadow and stunt the "economically-anemic Japan-India

¹⁶ David Brewster, "The India-Japan Security Relationship: An Enduring Security Partnership?," *Asian Security* 6, no. 2 (2010): 116, ProQuest (743038939).

¹⁷ Harsh V. Pant, "India in the Asia-Pacific: Rising Ambitions with an Eye on China," *Asia-Pacific Review* 14, no. 1 (May, 2007): 66, ProQuest (59770156).

¹⁸ Pant, "India in the Asia-Pacific," 66; Brewster, "The India-Japan Security Relationship," 116.

¹⁹ Michael J. Green, "Japan, India, and the Strategic Triangle with China," in *Strategic Asia 2011-12: Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers*, eds. Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner, and Jessica Keough (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011), Kindle edition, location 3189.

bilateral partnership” with its “top heavy security component.”²⁰ The second mark on the negative side of the tally is their differing stance on nuclear weapons, including Green and Roehrig. While they see India’s nuclear weapons as a roadblock to Japan, they also see room for potential cooperation with India’s hope for a global disarmament regime.²¹

The largest obstacle in this category of literature is the lack of recent discussion. Only one of the articles referenced above is from this decade, and that is Green’s article on the strategic triangle between Japan, India, and China.²² In early 2014, there was one piece written by Taylor Washburn in *The National Interest*, which was written shortly after India welcomed Prime Minister Abe to India and was in response to an Indian newspaper stating that India had no problem with Abe visiting the Yasukuni shrine.²³ The other American or European pieces from this decade are articles in the *Wall Street Journal* or *Washington Post* that highlight particular new developments.²⁴

While there has been little written outside, India and Japan have many more recent entries in the literature. While some of the discussion parallels the previous group, they also highlight different possible factors.

Like the analysts residing outside India or Japan, a majority of Indian analysts who deal with Japan relations cite the rise of China as a major factor in promoting Japan-India relations. One of these is Chellaney, who argues that China’s rise is further dividing Asia and that the Japan-India partnership has the potential to balance this effect, ensure

²⁰ Terence Roehrig, "An Asian Triangle: India's Relationship with China and Japan," *Asian Politics & Policy* 1, no. 2 (April 2009): 177, ProQuest (818792221).

²¹ Green, "Japan, India, and the Strategic Triangle," location 3140; Roehrig, "An Asian Triangle," 175–176.

²² Green, "Japan, India, and the Strategic Triangle," location 2695–3228.

²³ Taylor Washburn, "India and Japan Draw Closer: Risks and Rewards," *National Interest* (February 19, 2014), <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/india-japan-draw-closer-risks-rewards-9898>.

²⁴ Harsh V. Pant, "Meeting the China Challenge: the U.S., Japan and India Confer on Security Concerns in Response to Rising Aggression from Beijing," *Wall Street Journal*, Dec 20, 2011, ProQuest (911740382); Santanu Choudhury, "India and Japan Begin Joint Naval Exercises; Countries Look to Tighten Military Ties as both Face Territorial Disputes with China," *Wall Street Journal*, Dec 19, 2013, ProQuest (1469282473); Gordon Fairclough, "World News: In Japanese Visit to Delhi, A Message Goes Out to China," *Wall Street Journal*, Jan 27, 2014, Eastern edition, ProQuest (1491720469); Rama Lakshmi and Chico Harlan, "India, Japan Draw Closer, with an Eye on China," *Washington Post*, May 31, 2013, ProQuest (1356855453).

peace in Asia, and help bring the region together.²⁵ In a similar vein, General Thakur of the Indian Army states that some in India have sought ties with Japan to balance China as early as the 1950s, or before the Sino-Indian War.²⁶

Instead of looking at U.S. influence, Indian writers have focused more on Japan's increased global involvement and India's rising global status and Look East policy. Paul believes that "Japan's emergence as a 'normal' power" and Tokyo's realization of India's strategic location are two of the three driving factors, the other being China.²⁷ Similarly, Ghosh sees Japan as moving from a merchant state to a normal state and expanding its navy's influence.²⁸ Kesavan, among others, looks to India's economic growth and Look East policy as the reasons for increased India-Japan relations.²⁹

Outside analysts looked at economics and nuclear cooperation as the biggest barriers, and while some authors in India see these as issues the biggest problem they identify is a lack of experience in each other's cultures. Jaiswal and George argue that the lack of experience with the other's culture is what has inhibited the establishment of lasting ties between Japan and India, instead of the lack of economic ties.³⁰

Most of the Japanese who wrote in English were contributing to compilations, and this tends to bring out alternate views to what has already been contributed. In this vein, while others have pointed to the rise of China, Ito argues: "it is readily apparent that overemphasizing the 'China threat' has not helped to deepen bilateral cooperation because of the different diplomatic and security situations;" India's main issues with China are over Tibet, Kashmir, and its border issue while Japan is more worried about the

²⁵ Brahma Chellaney, "Security and Strategic Challenges in Asia: Prospects of Japan-India Co-Operation," *Observer Research Foundation Seminar Series* 1, no. 2 (2008): 3, ProQuest (58817965).

²⁶ Thakur, *Emerging Challenges in UN Peacekeeping Operations*, xxi.

²⁷ Joshy M. Paul, "India and Japan: Reluctant Idealism to Practical Realism," *South Asian Survey* 15, no. 1 (January 2008): 110–11, ProQuest (59857169).

²⁸ Madhuchhanda. Ghosh, "India and Japan's Growing Synergy." *Asian Survey* 48, no. 2 (March, 2008): 282, ProQuest (59810260).

²⁹ K. V. Kesavan, "Security and Strategic Challenges in Asia: Prospects of Japan-India Co-Operation," *Observer Research Foundation Seminar Series* 1, no. 2 (2008): 12, ProQuest (58817965).

³⁰ Kesavan, "Security and Strategic Challenges in Asia," 12; P. A. George, "Present Status of Japanese Studies in India: Prospects and Problems," in *India-Japan Relations in Emerging Asia*, 245–263.

Senkaku/Daiyou islands and Southeast Asia.³¹ In the same compilation, Tamari addresses the issue of American influence by arguing that while Japan and America have had similar policies toward India, it is due to their similar interests and not American guidance.³²

The view of nuclear cooperation in Japan appears conflicted. For example, Horimoto takes both sides. First, he argues, “one area of natural fit for Japan and India to explore is nuclear cooperation.”³³ He then states that India’s nuclear weapons program prevents easy cooperation without “Japan’s abandonment of half a century of anti-nuclear advocacy.”³⁴

The one contemporary driver that most Japanese experts have emphasized, even when discussing other factors, is the mutual interest of maritime security, comprising keeping the sea lines of communication open, supporting the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and combatting piracy. Ito discusses the work against piracy, as does Horimoto when introducing the convergence of Japan and India’s strategic interests.³⁵

The literature base for Japan-India relations is growing rapidly, but still small in comparison to many and is mostly comprised of articles and compilations; furthermore, most of the literature comes from outside the United States. Many of these pieces have focused on the contemporary issues bringing Japan and India together or keeping them apart, with some discussing the benefits for Asia. Few have discussed whether these factors or the changes made will have an enduring impact, or delved into American interests in the relationship. There has also been little discussion on what domestic issues

³¹ Toru Ito, “‘China Threat’ Theory in Indo-Japan Relations,” in *India-Japan Relations in Emerging Asia*, 125.

³² Kazutoshi Tamari, “Explaining the Similarity,” 169.

³³ Takenori Horimoto, “The Japan-India Nuclear Agreement: Enhancing Bilateral Agreement?,” *Asia Pacific Bulletin*, no. 107 (April 15, 2011), <http://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/japan-india-nuclear-agreement-enhancing-bilateral-agreement>.

³⁴ Horimoto, “The Japan-India Nuclear Agreement: Enhancing Bilateral Agreement?”

³⁵ Ito, “‘China Threat’ Theory in Indo-Japan Relations,” 125; Takenori Horimoto, “Strategic Convergence of Japan-India Relations and China’s Emergence,” in *India-Japan Relations in Emerging Asia*, 25–26.

might be keeping them apart, except for Jaiswal and George's argument about cultural awareness. A principal function of this thesis is to fill these knowledge gaps.

D. ROADMAP

In order to answer the question of the enduring capability of Japan-India relations, it is first necessary to determine what factors have and have not had a role in driving Tokyo and New Delhi toward the current relationship. This thesis analyzes the various possible factors to determine their effect. These possible drivers have been divided into four categories, each assessed in a separate chapter: the effect of major world powers, Japan and India's multilateral and bilateral engagement, the internal issues of Japan, and the internal issues of India. Throughout these chapters and the conclusion, this thesis will show that an increasing realist viewpoint and balance of power politics, coupled with regional factors and rising international participation by Japan and India, have led to the development of the current expansion of Japan-India relations. The final chapter will also discuss the likely enduring nature of India-Japan cooperation, and factors that could potentially derail this expectation.

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II. MAJOR WORLD POWERS

According to Kenneth Waltz, states tend to create balances of power as they seek to ensure the preservation of their state in an anarchic system where no external help is guaranteed.³⁶ This happens because no country operates in a vacuum; the actions of one country affect those around it and around the world. Moreover, the more powerful a country is, the greater its potential to influence those around it, and according to balance of power theory, the more likely other states are to try and balance that influence. China and the United States, with the largest economies and military budgets in the world, are major factors in these calculations. Russia, with its strong ties to India and territorial dispute with Japan in the Kuril Islands, could also be a major consideration; however, Moscow has not exerted much influence either way in the India-Japan relationship to date. Thus, this chapter looks at the affect that the great powers of China and the United States have on Japan-India relations primarily through balance of power concepts.

A. CHINA: THE MIDDLE COUNTRY

In December of 1978, Beijing enacted Gaige Kaifang, or “reform and opening up.”³⁷ With that change, China began to grow economically, initiating what is called “the rise of China.” China currently has the world’s largest population, second largest economy, and second largest military budget, and can therefore have a large impact on those around it. In the case of Japan and India, the meaning of the Chinese characters for China, middle country, is fitting as well due to its location between the two. Initially, Japan and India took divergent views regarding China; however, with China’s growth and the changing security environment after the Cold War, India and Japan’s interests regarding China appear to have merged due to Beijing’s more assertive position and their desire to balance China’s rise.

³⁶ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), 118.

³⁷ Xiaodong Zhu, “Understanding China’s Growth: Past, Present, and Future,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 26, no. 4 (2012): 110.

1. India

India's troubles with China start not long after India's Independence. In 1950, China took control of Tibet, which India protested; it also lengthened the China-India border considerably. According to the Correlates of War Program (COW), there were eight different militarized events along the border in the 1950s, escalating from alerts and border fortifications to clashes at Longju and Kongka pass as border negotiations stalled.³⁸ The border dispute remained unresolved and escalated further into the 1962 Sino-Indian War where India's troops were quickly routed and approximately 14,000 square miles of territory was taken by China before Beijing declared a unilateral cease-fire.³⁹ The war did not resolve the border dispute for either side; China and India each claim territory that the other country controls, including Arunachal Pradesh, Aksai Chin, and parts of Kashmir as seen in Figure 1. These claims span over 47,000 square miles, which is roughly the size of New York.⁴⁰ After the war, Nehru stated: "Never forget that the basic challenge in South-East Asia is between India and China. That Challenge runs along the spine of Asia."⁴¹

³⁸ Glenn Palmer et al., "The MID4.01 Data Set, 2002–2010: Procedures, Coding Rules and Description," last modified February 5, 2013, <http://www.correlatesofwar.org>; Neville Maxwell, "China and India: The Un-Negotiated Dispute," *China Quarterly*, no. 43 (1970): 60, 62.

³⁹ Sumit Ganguly, "Indian Defence Policy," in *The Oxford Companion to Politics in India*, eds. Niraja Gopal Jayal and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 544; Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 37.

⁴⁰ Bill Emmott, *Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India, and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade*, revised edition (Boston: Mariner Books, 2009), 32.

⁴¹ Jawaharlal Nehru, quoted in K. Subrahmanyam, "Nehru and the India-China Conflict of 1962," in *Indian Foreign Policy: the Nehru Years* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1976), 107.



Figure 1. "South Asian Territorial Claims"⁴²

The border has continued to be a point of contention between China and India. In the two decades after the war, COW reports 12 more disputes along the border, with four of them resulting in casualties.⁴³ While the border incidents practically ceased for the last quarter of the twentieth century, they began increasing again in the twenty-first century. There were 3 militarized disputes in the first decade, culminating in an attempt by China to block India's ability to conduct flood relief in Arunachal Pradesh and Chinese Army (PLA) troops operating in the same area.⁴⁴ PLA troops have continued to enter Indian controlled Arunachal Pradesh since then and have even destroyed Indian military

⁴² "Fantasy Frontiers," *Economist*, February 8, 2012, http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/05/indian_pakistani_and_chinese_border_disputes.

⁴³ Palmer et al., "The MID4.01 Data Set."

⁴⁴ M. Taylor Fravel, "China Views India's Rise: Deepening Cooperation, Managing Differences," in *Strategic Asia 2011–12: Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers*, eds. Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner, and Jessica Keough (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011), Kindle edition, location 1910.

outposts.⁴⁵ Beijing has also increased infrastructure projects and PLA deployments in Chinese controlled Kashmir and Tibet.⁴⁶

Another source of contention has been at sea; some in India are concerned with China's increasing naval presence in the Indian Ocean. For example, in early 2014 a PLA Navy nuclear powered attack submarine (SSN) patrolled the Indian Ocean for several months; while Beijing reported it was there to protect sea-lines of communication (SLOC), it carried cruise missiles more suited for attacking land targets than mobile ships.⁴⁷ China has also increased its maritime presence by building seaports in Myanmar/Burma, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan among other locations, as seen in Figure 2. This line of ports, referred to as the string of pearls, has many in India feeling that China is attempting to encircle their country.⁴⁸

China's support to Pakistan, particularly its nuclear program, is yet one more concern for India. In 1976, Zulfikar Bhutto gained assistance in uranium enrichment from China.⁴⁹ In 1988, reports had emerged that China had supplied Pakistan with advanced warhead designs.⁵⁰ A few years later U.S. intelligence leaked information that Pakistan had received ballistic missiles or components from China.⁵¹

⁴⁵ "China Accused of Incursion in India's Arunachal Pradesh," *BBC News*, August 22, 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-23790860>; Harsh V. Pant, "India Comes to Terms with a Rising China," in *Strategic Asia 2011–12: Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers*, location 2441.

⁴⁶ Brahma Chellaney, "Rising Powers, Rising Tensions: The Troubled China-India Relationship," *SAIS Review* 32, no. 2 (2012): 102–03.

⁴⁷ Sandeep Unnithan, "Exclusive: Indian Navy Headless as Chinese Nuclear Sub Prowls Indian Ocean," *India Today*, March 21, 2014, <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/indian-navy-chinese-nuclear-sub-indian-ocean/1/350498.html>.

⁴⁸ Bill Emmott, *Rivals*, 54; Sam Chee Kong, "China's String of Pearls Strategy: Why is the U.S. Afraid and How Does it Affect Us?," *Malaysia Chronicle*, December 22, 2013, http://www.malaysia-chronicle.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=201131:chinese-string-of-pearls-strategy-complement-its-global-economic-domination#axzz2u4wRvxru.

⁴⁹ George Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), 196, 298, and 321.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 298.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 321.




Figure 2. “String of Pearls”⁵²

To avoid being overwhelmed by China and its increasing influence, India has sought a balance through internal and external means. Internally, India increased military spending; the year after the war New Delhi doubled the defense budget and the trend of increased military budgets continued for decades after.⁵³ More people in India also began to look at nuclear weapons after the war with China; the first formal demand for nuclear weapons from the Jana Sangh Party came after the Sino-Indian war in December of 1962.⁵⁴ After China’s nuclear test in 1964, even more interest was shown in obtaining nuclear weapons; for example, Sisir Gupta was concerned that China could “subject a non-nuclear India to periodic blackmail, weaken its people’s spirit of resistance and self-confidence, and thus achieve without a war its major political and military objectives in Asia.”⁵⁵ While China’s nuclear program was not the only reason given, India authorized

⁵² R. S. Vasan, “China’s Maritime Ambitions: Implications for Regional Security,” *The Sri Lanka Guardian*, January 21, 2011, <http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2011/01/chinas-maritime-ambitions-implications.html>.

⁵³ Perkovich, *India’s Nuclear Bomb*, 46.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Sumit Ganguly, “The Road to Pokhron II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” *International Security* 23, no. 4 (1999): 152.

its own nuclear program to increase research in defense applications just two years after China's nuclear test; eight years later India conducted its first underground tests with a nuclear device.⁵⁶ Externally, India looked for help around the globe. In 1962, New Delhi accepted aid from the United States to bring an end to the Sino-India war. Later it established its friendship with the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) based on their "mutual antipathy" toward China.⁵⁷ After the USSR collapsed at the end of the Cold War, India initiated its Look East policy to search for economic and military allies that could take the place of the USSR in its security.⁵⁸ Japan, as an advanced economy was one of many countries that India looked to when it looked east.

2. Japan

Japan and China share a long history of conflict going back centuries. Taro Aso, who later served as both foreign minister and prime minister of Japan, asked: "China and Japan have hated each other for a thousand years. Why should things be any different now?"⁵⁹ More recently, there have been several political rows between them that focus on Japan's WWII legacy; the Chinese feel that the "whitewashing" of Japan's actions in WWII in textbooks and museums indicate that the Japanese have not sufficiently atoned for their actions.⁶⁰ Beijing also cites visits by politicians to the Yasukuni shrine, which not only honors dead Japanese soldiers and sailors, but several class-A war criminals as well.⁶¹

Despite this animosity, Japan and China had relatively peaceful relations for 50 years after WWII. According to COW, Japan and China experienced 50 years with only three disputes militarized disputes after WWII, and all three were at the lowest

⁵⁶ Ganguly, "Indian Defence Policy," 546.

⁵⁷ K. P. S. Menon, "India and the Soviet Union," in *Indian Foreign Policy: the Nehru Years*, 146.

⁵⁸ Malone, *Does the Elephant Dance?*, 202.

⁵⁹ Taro Aso, quoted in Bill Emmott, *Rivals*, 96.

⁶⁰ Susan L. Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 155.

⁶¹ James Fallows, "Our New Champion in Self-Defeating Soft Power: Japan," *Atlantic*, December 25, 2013, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/12/our-new-champion-in-self-defeating-soft-power-japan/282654/>.

classification.⁶² Japan was also the first country in Asia to become a wealthy, modern country and did so decades well before its neighbors; as late as 1989, Japan's GDP was still more than six times that of China's.⁶³

This changed, however, in the last half of the 1990s. Tokyo watched as North Korea developed nuclear weapons and China grew economically and militarily, making some in Japan believe that Japan is less secure than it had been during the Cold War.⁶⁴ According to the COW, Japan and China had three militarized disputes from 1995 to 1999, followed by seven in the first decade of the twenty-first century.⁶⁵ Most of the military disputes are linked to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, the exclusive economic zones in the East China Sea, and the oil beneath them as seen in Figure 3. The various incursions include Chinese SSN's and destroyers sailing through the Tsugaru Strait between Hokkaido and Honshu, seen in Figure 4, or between the Ryukyu Islands of Okinawa and Miyako, seen in Figure 5.⁶⁶ In 2003, the Japanese Coast Guard seized Chinese fishing vessels near the disputed islands, and in 2010 another Chinese fishing boat was seized after it rammed a Japanese Coast Guard patrol cutter.⁶⁷ Then in 2013, China announced that it was expanding its Air Defense and Identification Zone to cover the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, shown in Figure 3.⁶⁸

⁶² Palmer et al., "The MID4.01 Data Set."

⁶³ 1989 Economic Statistics and Indicators, Economy Watch, last modified May 6, 2013, <http://www.economywatch.com/economic-statistics/year/1989/>.

⁶⁴ Sharif Shuja, *Japan's Changing Security Policy: an Overall View* (University of Maryland School of Law, 2006), 5.

⁶⁵ Palmer et al., "The MID4.01 Data Set."

⁶⁶ David Brewster, "How Uninhabited Islands Soured China-Japan Ties," *BBC*, April 24, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139>; Emmott, *Rivals*, 95; Jonathan Holslag, *Trapped Giant: China's Military Rise* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 77, <http://www.tandfonline.com.libproxy.nps.edu/toc/tadl20/50/416#.Uyuyg2NOWM8>.

⁶⁷ Palmer et al., "The MID4.01 Data Set"; Green, "Japan, India, and the Strategic Triangle," location 2969.

⁶⁸ Dongzhaohui ed., Statement by the Government of the People's Republic of China on Establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, Ministry of National Defense The People's Republic of China, last modified November 23, 2013, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/HomePicture/2013-11/23/content_4476177.htm.



Figure 3. East China Sea Dispute⁶⁹



Figure 4. Tsugaru Strait⁷⁰

⁶⁹ “How Uninhabited Islands Soured China-Japan Ties,” *BBC News*, April 24, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139>.

⁷⁰ Tsugaru Strait, *Wikipedia*, accessed April 4 2014, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tsugaru_Strait.




Figure 5. Ryukyu Islands⁷¹

Each of these incidents has increased tensions between the two states and appears to have moved many analysts and policy-makers in Japan toward more realist outlooks. According to Yutaka Kawashima, these changes have brought the “emergence of a new school of thought in Japan that stresses the importance of Japan having better relations with India or Russia as a counterforce to China.”⁷² This move toward realism also follows Michael Green’s premise that Japan has shifted from trying to establish an Asia centered on Japan and China, to forming ties in Asia to constrain China.⁷³ Thus In 1997, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Research Commission suggested that Japan go beyond strengthening the U.S. alliance and “strengthen [relations with] the cooperative countries, South Korea and Australia – nations which also have reason to be concerned

⁷¹ Ryukyu Islands, Factsanddetails.com, accessed September 10, 2014, <http://factsanddetails.com/japan/cat25/sub172/item957.html>.

⁷² Yutaka Kawashima, *Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads: Challenges and Options for the Twenty-First Century* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 12.

⁷³ Michael J. Green, *Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 26.

about China's future course."⁷⁴ Just a couple of years later, Japan began to reach out toward India with Prime Minister Mori's visit to New Delhi.

3. Arguments against Balancing China

While there is a strong case for China's rise being the driving force behind Japan and India's growing connections, there are indications against it. For India, China is a fellow developing country; with India and China being the two largest such countries, there are instances where India's interest align more closely with China than Japan; these include the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, World Trade Organization, and International Monetary Fund. India, however, has been willing to work with both China and Japan, based on the situation. Another cited misalignment is the lack a shared specific threat in China; instead, it is a just a vague threat where the relative threat perceptions do not align well.⁷⁵ In this instance, the source of the threat remains the same; moreover, it fails to account for a closer alignment of interests in Southeast Asia. Economically, both countries are more connected to China than they are to each other. China became Japan's number one trading partner in 2007, and now accounts for one-fifth of Japan's total trade volume.⁷⁶ India is less dependent on Chinese trade, but still has strong economic ties to China; since 2003, India's top three trading partners have been the United States, China, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with each making close to 10 percent of India's total trade.⁷⁷ With these large trade balances, neither country may be willing to provoke China. While these issues may influence Tokyo and New Delhi's calculations, there does not appear to be evidence that they have slowed or prevented Japan-India relations as the two continued to move closer through the beginning of the

⁷⁴ Liberal Democratic Party Research Commission on Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Policy of the Liberal Democratic Party – Part I: Japan's Asia-Pacific Strategy: The Challenges of Transformation* (Tokyo: Liberal Democratic Party, undated, released in English in May 1997), 23 quoted in Green, *Reluctant Realism*, 26.

⁷⁵ Ito, "'China Threat' Theory in Indo-Japan Relations," 121–23.

⁷⁶ Trade Statistics of Japan, Ministry of Finance, last modified August 2014, <http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/srch/indexe.htm>.

⁷⁷ Export Import Database, Government of India: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, last modified September 5, 2014, <http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/Default.asp>.

twenty-first century. Further, seeking to balance China's influence does not equate to seeking to contain or oppose China.

B. THE UNITED STATES: THE SOLE SUPERPOWER

America's influence on India-Japan relations has a very different quality than China's influence. The United States does not share a border with either country, nor has it made any unwanted military incursions for decades. There are, however, several instances where Washington has brought Japan and India together. After the December 2004 Tsunami in the Indian Ocean, the United States formed a response team with Japan, India, Australia, and the United States at its core; the inclusion of each was due not only to their capabilities, but also because Washington wanted to create an opportunity to work together and build stronger relations.⁷⁸ While the Indian and Japanese navies had interacted before, they had not done so outside of exercises and meetings. The three countries have continued to work together at sea since that time, including various naval exercises and the trilateral talks that started in 2011. These talks have covered a variety of topics, including security and humanitarian aid in South and Southeast Asia and domestic issues for the three countries.⁷⁹ While the United States has some influence in Japan-India relations, the extent of that influence may be smaller or different than supposed in Washington.

1. India

America's influence with India has historically been very small. For the first 40 plus years after India's independence, the two did not interact much or see eye to eye. The two countries were further divided by the Cold War with India looking to the USSR

⁷⁸ Michael J. Green, *Symposium on Japan and India: Challenges and Prospects in Asia and Pacific in the 21st Century*, March 10, 2006, 21, 45–46, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/sympo0603.txt>.

⁷⁹ Josh Rogin, "Inside the First Ever U.S.-Japan-India Trilateral Meeting," *Foreign Policy*, December 23, 2011, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/23/inside_the_first_ever_us_japan_india_trilateral_meeting; Indrani Bagchi, "India-Japan-US Trilateral Talks on a Higher Plane," *Times of India*, April 27, 2014, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-Japan-US-trilateral-talks-on-a-higher-plane/articleshow/34265657.cms>; Amit Baruah, "India, Japan for Upgrading Trilateral Talks with U.S.," *Hindu*, September 2, 2014, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-japan-for-upgrading-trilateral-talks-with-us/article6370826.ece>.

for weapons and support against China, and the United States' decision to make Pakistan a part of its strategy against communism.⁸⁰ With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, India lost its supplier of weapons, balance against China, and major trading partner. At this time, India began a "rediscovery of America," as it was in need of foreign investment, Western technology, and a new supplier of weapons.⁸¹

With India's growth and the change in world politics, New Delhi's interests have aligned with those of the United States more often than before; however, Indian leaders are careful to define the growing relationship as a "selective partnership" and not a strategic alliance.⁸² Even with this distinction, U.S.-India relations have been growing. International trade between the two countries totals near \$100 billion each year, and in 2005 India and the United States signed a 10-year defense pact that includes exercises and exchanges.⁸³ This agreement was recently extended for another 10 years, and expands cooperation in jointly develop military hardware.⁸⁴ The relation has had struggles as well. For example, there was the arrest of Indian diplomat Devyani Khobragade in New York in December 2013 and India's reprisal on a club at the U.S. embassy in New Delhi, as well as cries for an apology by the Indian people.⁸⁵ But while the road has not been smooth, India and the United States are closer than they have been at any time since India's independence.

2. Japan

Because of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the level of influence the United States has in Japan is much stronger than its influence in India. Some authors, like Purnendra Jain,

⁸⁰ Menon, "India and the Soviet Union," 146.

⁸¹ Shekhar Gupta, *India Redefines its Role* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 58.

⁸² Malone, *Does the Elephant Dance?*, 176–77.

⁸³ Sumit Ganguly, "Indian Defence Policy," 542; Frank Jack Daniel and David Brunnstrom, "India Tells U.S. to Close Embassy Club; Anger Exposes Flaws in Ties," *Reuters*, January 8, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/08/us-india-usa-diplomat-idUSBREA0709U20140108>.

⁸⁴ Sudhi Ranjan Sen, "India, US to Renew 10-Year Defence Pact, Jointly Develop Hardware," *NDTV*, August 8, 2014, <http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/india-us-to-renew-10-year-defence-pact-jointly-develop-military-hardware-573072>.

⁸⁵ Tom Watkins and Josh Levs, "Arrest, Strip Search of Indian Diplomat in New York Triggers Uproar," *CNN*, December 19, 2013, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/17/politics/india-us-diplomat/>; Daniel and Brunnstrom, "India Tells U.S. to Close Embassy Club."

argue that Japan's junior position in the alliance causes Japan to be reactive in strategic matters, responding to U.S. cues in its relationships with other countries.⁸⁶ Under this logic, as the United States forged closer ties to India, Japan jumped on the bandwagon and followed Washington's lead and encouragement.⁸⁷ This logic gives a plausible reason for many of Japan's actions toward India; Prime Minister Mori visited India five months after President Clinton, Tokyo lifted sanctions on India for their nuclear weapons test one month after Washington, and declared their strategic partnership with India three years after the United States.⁸⁸ It does not, however, explain the lack of a nuclear agreement, even after Japan began nuclear cooperation talks with India over four years ago. Another argument by Kazutoshi Tamari posits that the similarities come from the United States and Japan's common interests while Japan learns from the example of other countries, including the United States.⁸⁹ This argument better describes the security cooperation and attempts to account for the differences in nuclear policy.

Neither argument, however, adequately addresses other points of Japan-India relations. First, Japan and India's 2000 Coast Guard agreement not only happened five years before the U.S.-India Defense Relationship but also before the majority of defense cooperation agreements India has established.⁹⁰ Second, in 2011 Japan and India signed the CEPA, a trade agreement that is a first for India in scope.⁹¹ Japan and India have also been proactive in elements of their combined relationship with the United States. In 2007, Japan hosted a trilateral maritime exercise between Japan India, and the United States.⁹² That same year, India invited Japan to participate in the Malabar exercise, a multilateral

⁸⁶Purnendra Jain, "Japan-India Relations: Peaks and Troughs," *Round Table* 99, no. 409 (August 2010): 403.

⁸⁷Jain, "Westward Ho! Japan Eyes India Strategically," 21, 25.

⁸⁸Tamari, "Explaining the Similarity," 160.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 167–168.

⁹⁰Brian K. Hendrick, *India's Strategic Defense Transformation: Expanding Global Relationships* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 61–67.

⁹¹Srabani Roy Choudhury, "India-Japan Economic Partnership: Scope and Prospect," in *India-Japan Relations in Emerging Asia*, ed. Takenori Horimoto and Lalima Varma (New Delhi: Manohar, 2013), 236–37.

⁹²National Institute for Defense Studies, *East Asian Strategic Review 2008*, (Tokyo: NIDS, 2008), 127, <http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/e2013.html> 220.

exercise between India, the United States, and other regional countries.⁹³ Japan participated in the Malabar exercises in 2007 and 2009 and has agreed to participate in the next exercises in 2015.⁹⁴ Prime Minister Abe also suggested a quadrilateral forum with Japan, India, Australia, and the United States; however, this forum failed to materialize due to Chinese protests and lack of interest in antagonizing China.⁹⁵ In each of these cases, Japan and India moved ahead of any lead or example of any country, including the United States.

A third argument is that instead of encouragement from the United States, it is a declining America that is influencing Japan. As Michael Green highlights, Japan had nowhere to go for help with their security at the beginning of the twenty-first century besides the United States.⁹⁶ As the century started, Tokyo could see that there were limits to U.S. power as the U.S. military became involved in Afghanistan and Iraq while being restricted in its options regarding North Korea; this reality imposed subsequent limits as to how much Japan could rely on American security guarantees in the future.⁹⁷ Thus, in the words of Purnendra Jain, “Tokyo sees that Japan now has no choice; it must engage new security partners since its principle defender, the U.S., may be unable to live up to the guarantees that it could earlier fulfill.”⁹⁸ Another concern for Japan comes when America has occasionally moved closer to China, leaving Japan wondering whom America would side with in a crisis.⁹⁹ With these two issues, Japan may have increased incentives to look for other countries that can come to Japan’s aid if the need arises. It has not, however, led Japan to distance itself from the United States.

⁹³ Shinzo Abe and Manmohan Singh, “Joint Statement On the Roadmap for New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global Partnership between Japan and India,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, August 22, 2007, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/joint-2.html>.

⁹⁴ Borah, *Japan-India Maritime Cooperation*, 7; Pranab Samanta, “India Invites Japan to be Part of Malabar Naval Exercises With the US,” *The Indian Express*, January 25, 2014, <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/politics/india-invites-japan-to-be-part-of-malabar-naval-exercises-with-the-us/>.

⁹⁵ Jain, “Japan’s Expanding Security Networks: India and Australia,” 8.

⁹⁶ Green, *Reluctant Realism*, 22.

⁹⁷ Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan’s Security Agenda: Military, Economic and Environmental Dimensions* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 144.

⁹⁸ Purnendra Jain, “Japan’s Expanding Security Networks: India and Australia,” 13.

⁹⁹ Kesavan, *India and Japan: Changing Dimensions of Partnership*, 10.

The United States has participated in the growing Japan-India relations, through naval exercises, trilateral talks, and possibly through its move toward India while being a strong ally of Japan. Instead of simply following America's lead, however, Tokyo and India appear to be forging their own path, while willing to involve Washington when it suits them.

C. CONCLUSION

Kautilya, an Indian philosopher who lived 2300 years ago, said: "Your neighbor is your natural enemy and your neighbor's neighbor is your friend."¹⁰⁰ While Nehru and Yoshida may have started their countries down paths that did not follow this realist framework, Japan and India have begun to adopt it anyway. At least since the Sino-Indian war, India has worked to maintain a balance with China, whether through its nuclear program, treaty with Russia, or more recently with its Look East policy with Japan and others. In the East, Japan has also begun to adopt a more realist stance as it looks to balance against a regionally hegemonic China. The United States, while not irrelevant, has had less impact on the relationship between Japan and India. For India, the United States is another possible balancer vis-à-vis China; however they are careful to not antagonize China or lose their autonomy to an alliance. Japan, while allied to the United States that is courting India, has also pursued an independent policy with India.

This chapter finds solid support for balance-of-power explanations for the recent strengthening of India-Japan relations. Other types of driving forces, however, may support or hinder these geostrategic factors. In particular, other forces may strongly influence whether recent strengthening will be enduring or transient. The following chapters assess other such types of influences.

¹⁰⁰ Dai Bing, "Indo-Japanese Relations in the Post Cold-War Era," *China.org.cn*, trans. Luo Huaiyu, December 11, 2010, http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2010-12/11/content_21518845.htm.

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III. MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL INFLUENCES

Ajeet Jaiswal, while hopeful for growing Japan-India ties, feels that “India and Japan should as mature nations, find their own reasons for ... an ‘all-weather’ partnership, instead of relying on the U.S. to egg them on or on China to scare them into one.”¹⁰¹ The variety of international institutions and bilateral relations in which both countries may participate has the potential to be India’s and Japan’s “own reasons.” Maritime security, ASEAN and its forums, UNSC reforms, the nonproliferation regime, economic relations, and cultural ties all have had the potential to bring them together or keep them apart. This chapter discusses the effect, or lack thereof, of each of these forums for interaction on the growing Japan-India relationship.

A. MARITIME SECURITY

Beyond the coaxing and scaring of the major powers that Jaiswal comments on, maritime security is the most discussed element of Japan-India relations. Perhaps this is not too surprising, considering that maritime security has been one of the more consistent elements of the Japan-India relationship; at almost every meeting, the Prime Ministers of each country emphasize its prominence within the growing relationship.¹⁰² Maritime

¹⁰¹ Ajeet Jaiswal, “Changing Strategic and Global Relationship Between India and Japan: Past and Present,” *Asia-Pacific Journal of Social Science* special issue, no. 3 (December 2012): 44.

¹⁰² Abe and Singh, “Joint Statement On the Roadmap for New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global Partnership between Japan and India”; Taro Aso and Manmohan Singh, “Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation Between India and Japan,” Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India, October 22, 2008, <http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5408/Joint+Declaration+on+Security+Cooperation+between+India+and+Japan>; Yukio Hatoyama and Manmohan Singh, “Joint Statement by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and Prime Minister Dr. Yukio Hatoyama: New State of India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership,” Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India, December 29, 2009, <http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5084/Joint+Statement+by+Prime+Minister+Dr+Manmohan+Singh+and+Prime+Minister+Dr+Yukio+Hatoyama+New+Stage+of+IndiaJapan+Strategic+and+Global+Partnership>; Naoto Kan and Manmohan Singh, “Joint Statement: Vision for Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership in the Next Decade,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, October 25, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/pm1010/joint_st.html; Shinzo Abe and Manmohan Singh, “Joint Statement on the Occasion of Official Visit of the Prime Minister of Japan to India (January 25–27, 2014),” Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India, January 25, 2014, <http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/22772/Joint+Statement+on+the+occasion+of+Official+Visit+of+the+Prime+Minister+of+Japan+to+India+January+2527+2014>.

security is also a natural fit, as each country considers itself a maritime country and relies heavily on traffic through the Indian Ocean and South China Sea.

This maritime focus makes sense for both countries. 80–85 percent of India’s international trade is conducted by sea, with over 50 percent traveling through the Straits of Malacca.¹⁰³ As an island, basically all of Japan’s foreign trade is conducted by sea; moreover, 80 percent of Japan’s oil and 20 percent of ships travelling to Japan sail through the same straits.¹⁰⁴ These straits, along with other waters in Southeast Asia, have been a hotspot for piracy throughout history.¹⁰⁵ In the 1990s, however, piracy began to increase in frequency, and by 2003 the International Maritime Bureau-Piracy Reporting Center reported 172 piracy attacks in Southeast Asia.¹⁰⁶ Because of the many small islands at the Southeast entrance of the Malacca Strait, there are multiple places where the passage becomes less than one mile wide.¹⁰⁷ These small passages funnel ships to locations where pirates can almost always find targets; they are also so narrow that a damaged ship can close some of these passages and restrict the flow of traffic. Since a trip that avoids the Malacca Straits adds approximately 1,000 miles to voyages between the East China Sea and Indian Ocean, the straits are quite important.¹⁰⁸

The piracy in the South China Sea impacts both countries and may have helped jumpstart the India-Japan relationship. In 1999, The Indian Navy and Coast Guard recovered the Japanese merchant ship, *MV Alondra Rainbow*, which had been hijacked in the Malacca Strait.¹⁰⁹ The first anti-piracy exercise between Japan and India’s Coast

¹⁰³ Kesavan, “Security and Strategic Challenges in Asia,” 15; Malone, *Does the Elephant Dance?*, 216.

¹⁰⁴ Joshy M. Paul, “India and Japan: Reluctant Idealism to Practical Realism,” 112.

¹⁰⁵ Sheldon W. Simon, “Safety and Security in the Malaccan Straits: the Limits of Collaboration,” *Asian Security* 7, no. 1 (2011): 27.

¹⁰⁶ John F. Bradford, “Shifting the Tides Against Piracy in Southeast Asian Waters,” *Asian Survey* 31, no. 3 (December 2009): 474.

¹⁰⁷ National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, *Publication 174: Sailing Directions (Enroute) Strait of Malacca and Sumatera*, 12th ed. (Springfield, VA: NGA Maritime Safety Office, 2013), 5, 17, 28, 48, 50, 95, http://msi.nga.mil/MSISiteContent/StaticFiles/NAV_PUBS/SD/Pub174/Pub174bk.pdf.

¹⁰⁸ Tetsuo Kotani, *Legal Expert’s Workshop on Maritime Piracy in the Horn of Africa* (Ocean Policy Research Foundation, April 7, 2009), 3, <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/49c55dbb-d2a3-4c8a-a013-b8d72ee36beb/Kotani.aspx>.

¹⁰⁹ Joshy M. Paul, “India and Japan: Reluctant Idealism to Practical Realism,” 112.

Guards took place just one year later, soon after Prime Minister Mori's visit to New Delhi.¹¹⁰ Since this time, the Coast Guards of Japan and India have conducted bilateral exercises almost every year. Both are also involved in the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), which was started in 2006 based on Prime Minister Koizumi's 2001 anti-piracy proposal.

While maintaining the SLOC and fighting piracy have been the primary focus, concerns over China appear beneath the surface. As seen previously, Japan and India are concerned over Chinese actions at sea, as are other nations in the area. In a secret memorandum, China stated that they were working to consolidate power in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea.¹¹¹ Thus with China becoming increasingly aggressive in the South China Sea, many ASEAN states have begun to "look to the Indian navy as a potential counterweight to China."¹¹² For example, in 2012, both Vietnam and the Philippines asked India for explicit support against China in their territorial dispute.¹¹³ Some of these same countries are believed to have encouraged Japan's antipiracy projects in the South China Sea "to engage Japan as a potential naval power in the region to counter China's influence."¹¹⁴ While China may not be the only factor in Japan, India, and some ASEAN member's maritime security calculations, it does appear that it is a major component for some of them.

B. ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN)

India and Japan share more than an interest in combating piracy in Southeast Asia, they also both deal with ASEAN, its member nations, and its various multilateral

¹¹⁰ Thakur, ed., *Emerging Challenges in UN Peacekeeping Operations*, xxi; Borah, *Japan-India Maritime Cooperation*, 7; Kamal Chandra Tiwari, "India-United States Strategic Relationship: A Paradigm Shift Since 1998 a Case Study" (PhD diss., Tilak Maharashtra University, 2009), 59, <http://ietd.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/2480>.

¹¹¹ Pant, "India Comes to Terms With a Rising China," location 2301.

¹¹² Carlyle A. Thayer, "The Rise of China and India: Challenging or Reinforcing Southeast Asia's Autonomy?," in *Strategic Asia 2011-12: Asia Responds to its Rising Powers India and China*, location 6802.

¹¹³ C. Raja Mohan, "An Uncertain Trumpet? India's Role in Southeast Asian Security," *India Review* 12, no. 3 (2013): 134.

¹¹⁴ Hughes, *Japan's Re-emergence as a "Normal" Military Power*, 121.

forums. This interaction with Southeast Asia and its forums began separately for both states and at different times, but they have gained more common ground in the region as time has passed.

Japan has been involved in Southeast Asia and ASEAN for decades, and with India's Look East policy New Delhi has become increasingly involved in the region as well. India became a dialogue partner with ASEAN in 1994, two years later India joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and in 2005 the East Asia Summit (EAS) was created with India as a member.¹¹⁵ India is also part of the Shangri-La dialogue and ASEAN Defense Ministers +8 meeting.¹¹⁶

Japan-India cooperation in ASEAN has taken several forms, including working together in development projects and the previously mentioned maritime security. Japanese encouragement also helped India join the ARF; Japan was also insistent that India, along with Australia and New Zealand part of the EAS from the start.¹¹⁷

Another country involved in ASEAN is China, and like maritime security several analysts, including Harsh Pant, Chien-Peng Chung, and Purnendra Jain, have cited Japan's desire to counter China's influence as the motivating factor in Tokyo's lobbying for Indian membership in ASEAN related forums.¹¹⁸ At the symposium "Building an East Asian Community," three reasons were given for Japan to want India in these forums: first, India's large economic potential in East Asia; second, maritime security and India's strategic location for maintaining the SLOC; and third, maintaining a balance in

¹¹⁵ Kesavan, *India and Japan: Changing Dimensions of Partnership*, 7; C. Raja Mohan, "India's Geopolitics and Southeast Asian Security," *Southeast Asian Affairs* (2008): 47.

¹¹⁶ David Brewster, "India's Defense Strategy and the India-ASEAN Relationship," *India Review* 12, no. 3 (2013): 152.

¹¹⁷ Jain, "Westward Ho! Japan Eyes India Strategically," 20; Chieng-Peng Chung, "Japan's Involvement in Asia-centered Regional Forums in the Context of Relations with China and the United States," *Asian Survey* 51, no. 3 (2011): 426.

¹¹⁸ Pant, "India in the Asia-Pacific," 66; Chung, 426; Jain, "Westward Ho! Japan Eyes India Strategically," 20.

the region.¹¹⁹ Like the maritime security realm, while Japan and India may not be opposing China and have other interests in cooperation, balancing China does appear to be a factor in their increased involvement and cooperation in ASEAN's various forums.

C. UNSC REFORMS

Another multilateral cause on which Japan and India find themselves together is reforming the UNSC and gaining permanent seats. These two countries joined with Germany and Brazil in a coalition called the G-4 in an effort to strengthen their positions.¹²⁰ While this common goal can bring India and Japan together, there are limits to how close it can bring them.

First, UNSC reform is a limited goal that does not require broad connections between the two countries. For instance, Japan's relations with Germany and Brazil, the other two countries in the G-4, are limited to economic and research ties that have existed for decades.¹²¹ A second limiting factor for UNSC reforms in bringing Japan and India together is that if the G-4 achieves their goal, there will be no further cause for these four countries to maintain their special pact as they join the current five permanent members of the security council.

There is also the problem created by a low probability of quick success. While this does mean that Japan, India, Brazil, and Germany will be working together for some time to come, it can also generate friction between the countries caused by the lack of progress. The low likelihood of success and the potential for friction come from the various hurdles to cross in achieving UNSC reform. First, various plans have been proposed to deal with the veto power, how regions and states of different sizes will be

¹¹⁹ Remarks by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, Tommy Koh, Fuabashi Yoichi, and Shiraishi Takashi, at the Public Symposium, "Building an East Asian Community," hosted by the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIJA), with the support of MOFA, Akasaka, Tokyo, March 17, 2010, http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/kouenkai/2010/100317e-EAC_Symposium_Program.pdf.

¹²⁰ Jose E. Guzzardi and Mark J. Mullenbach, "The Politics of Seeking a Permanent Seat on the United Nations Security Council: an Analysis of the Case of Japan," *Midsouth Political Science Review* 9 (2008-2009): 36, http://uca.edu/politicalscience/files/2011/05/3_Guzzardi_and_Mullenbach.pdf.

¹²¹ Japan-Brazil Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, last modified November 2013, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/brazil/data.html>; Japan-Germany Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, last modified September 5, 2014, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/germany/>.

represented, and new categories of nonpermanent seats.¹²² These issues have been raised for over a decade and still no solution has been accepted. Second, as former Indian Ambassador to the UN Arundhati Ghosh pointed out, there are various rivalries that will lead countries to vote against their rivals gaining power, including “India-Pakistan, India-China, Germany-Italy, Brazil-Mexico-Argentina, South-Africa-Nigeria-Egypt,” Japan-China, and Japan-South Korea.¹²³ China’s inclusion in these rivalries adds another wrinkle for both Japan and India; all five permanent members of the Security Council, including China, will have to agree to any reforms.¹²⁴ China is not likely to give their support for several reasons, but primarily because China would lose its status as the only Asian UNSC permanent member.¹²⁵ While the four countries of the G-4 have maintained solidarity so far, China’s hardline stance, particularly against Japan’s permanent membership in the UNSC, could lead to a division within the G-4 if the others look for greater support from China.¹²⁶

While UNSC reform is a common platform for India and Japan, the low level of interaction required, the lack of a mission beyond reform, and the low probability of success all form barriers to building a lasting relationship upon it. China’s veto vote again brings China into the mix, and in a way that could cause strife between the G-4 countries, rather than becoming a common opponent in the reform debate.

¹²² President of the General Assembly, “Non Paper” (UNGA, December 10, 2013), 1–4, https://www.pminewyork.org/pdf/non_paper.pdf.

¹²³ Arundhati Ghosh, interviewed by Suhasini Haidar, *World View with Suhasini Haidar*, CNN-IBN Live, September 24, 2011, <http://ibnlive.in.com/news/indias-quest-for-permanent-unsc-seat-a-pipedream/251396-64-139.html>.

¹²⁴ James Paul and Celine Nahory, “Theses Toward a Democratic Reform of the UN Security Council,” *Global Policy Forum*, July 13, 2005, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/41131.html>.

¹²⁵ Peter Harris, “Why Japan Will Never Be a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council,” *National Interest*, August 4, 2014, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-japan-will-never-be-permanent-member-the-un-security-11014>; Preetam Kaushik, “India’s Quest For Permanent UN Security Council Seat: The Ball is in China’s Court,” *Business Insider: India*, September 26, 2014, <http://www.businessinsider.in/Indias-Quest-For-Permanent-UN-Security-Council-Seat-The-Ball-Is-In-Chinas-Court/articleshow/43511693.cms>.

¹²⁶ Kaushik, “India’s Quest For Permanent UN Security Council Seat.”

D. NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) AND COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT)

Unlike the previous multilateral connections, Japan and India have not seen eye to eye on the nonproliferation regime. Japan is a supporter of both the NPT and the CTBT, while India has refused to sign either treaty. After the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998, Japan undertook several initiatives against India and Pakistan, including cutting off aid, meetings, and seeking multilateral action. Since then, India has not eliminated its nuclear weapons and has continued to develop its nuclear weapons program while Japan has continued to support the nonproliferation regime, yet Japan and India have moved from estrangement to global partners.

One possible reason is that Japan and India's positions are not as far apart as they appear. Initially, Japan and India supported nonproliferation and disarmament; at one point they also both opposed the NPT. For decades, India has both developed its nuclear program and attempted to gain support for a comprehensive nuclear disarmament; its stated problem with the NPT is the discriminatory nature towards non-nuclear states and the lack of a plan for disarmament.¹²⁷ For example, Rajiv Gandhi tried to gain support for disarmament while simultaneously increasing funding for nuclear and military research.¹²⁸

Japan took two years to sign the NPT, but did not ratify it for another six years. Publicly, Japan stated that it would not ratify the treaty until the nuclear powers took steps towards disarmament while declassified documents state that ratification was delayed to avoid upsetting members of the LDP wanted to Japan to go nuclear.¹²⁹ Since then, various Japanese leaders have made statements concerning Japan's capability to go nuclear; recently Ichiro Ozawa told Chinese leaders that Japan was capable of creating

¹²⁷ Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb*, 104, 133–34.

¹²⁸ Ganguly, "The Road to Pokhoran II," 164–65.

¹²⁹ "Japan Refused to Promise NPT Passage in '73 Statement With U.S.," *Japan Times*, December 22, 2008, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2008/12/22/national/japan-refused-to-promise-npt-passage-in-73-statement-with-u-s/#.VHEbhIuprZI>.

three to four thousand warheads while Yasuo Fukuda and the current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe have restated that nuclear weapons do not violate Japan's constitution.¹³⁰

This argument, however, overstates Japan's move towards nuclear weapons. When politicians have gone beyond "can" and suggest that Japan "should" go nuclear, popular support declines and they can be dismissed like Shingo Nishimura was after stating that the lack of nuclear weapons has left Japan vulnerable to "rape" by nuclear powers.¹³¹ It also does not explain Japan's unanimous resolution condemning India's detonation of a nuclear device in 1974, the ratification of the NPT two years after India's nuclear 1974 nuclear test, or Japan's actions in 1998: recalling its ambassador; calling an emergency UNSC meeting using the nonpermanent seat it currently held; attempting to push resolutions in the UN, UNSC, G-8 summit, and ARF; establishing the "Emergency Action Forum on Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation"; and cutting off 133 billion yen in loans and 3.5 billion yen in grants.¹³²

Another argument is that Japan has adopted a more realist framework internationally. After Japan took action against India and Pakistan, it found that few countries were willing to lend their support. For example, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom all refused to enact unilateral sanctions or support sanctions in the UN; ASEAN chose not to get involved as well, stating: "We'll leave it to some other braver country."¹³³ Japan's attempt to use multilateral institutions to prevent proliferation in South Asia had failed. At the same time, Japan's security situation was changing. After almost twenty years without any militarized disputes with China or South Korea, and over fifteen years with Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the situation had changed. In the mid to late 1990s, Japan watched China begin to conduct exercises in near the Senkaku/Daioyu Islands, test nuclear weapons, and take a more provocative stance towards Japan while South Korea began to enforce its claim on the

¹³⁰ Hughes, *Japan's Re-emergence as a "Normal" Military Power*, 93–94.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Satu P. Limaye, "Tokyo's Dynamic Policy: Japan and the Subcontinent's Nuclear Tests," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 22, no. 2 (2000): 324–26; Jain, "Japan-India Relations: Peaks and Troughs," 406.

¹³³ Limaye, "Tokyo's Dynamic Policy: Japan and the Subcontinent's Nuclear Tests," 324–27.

Dokdo/Takeshima islands and the surrounding waters.¹³⁴ Months after Japan began pursuing action against India, North Korea fired a Taepodong-1 missile over Japan.¹³⁵ The following years Japan dealt with multiple skirmishes with DPRK ships in Japanese waters.¹³⁶ Fears that North Korea was developing nuclear weapons also spread during this time after the DPRK left the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1994.¹³⁷ Under the realist argument, the combination of multilateral failure and increasing security threats caused Japan to reassess its position on India's nuclear weapons. This scenario accounts for the change in perception and policy over time, as well as other actions discussed previously that brought Japan and India together.

E. ECONOMIC TIES

In their annual meetings, the prime ministers of Japan and India have repeatedly touted the growing economic ties between their two countries as another pillar in their “strategic and global partnership.” These rosy statements, however, do not always match what is going on.¹³⁸ More than one author has described the economic relations between Tokyo and New Delhi as “anemic,” and Madhuchanda Ghosh argues that “the relative paucity of (and asymmetry in) their economic ties” is an obstacle to achieving “a truly ‘strategic’ relationship.”¹³⁹ The paucity can be seen in both the numbers and the kinds of commodities being traded, yet Japan and India have continued to move closer during the twenty-first century.

¹³⁴ Palmer et al., “The MID4.01 Data Set.”

¹³⁵ “Timeline on North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” *New York Times*, last modified 20 November, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/02/05/world/asia/northkorea-timeline.html?_r=0#/time238_7090.

¹³⁶ Palmer et al., “The MID4.01 Data Set.”

¹³⁷ “Timeline on North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” *New York Times*.

¹³⁸ Abe and Singh, “Joint Statement On the Roadmap for New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global Partnership between Japan and India”; Aso and Singh, “Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation Between India and Japan”; Hatoyama and Singh, “Joint Statement by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and Prime Minister Dr. Yukio Hatoyama”; Kan and Singh, “Joint Statement: Vision for Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership in the Next Decade”; Abe and Singh, “Joint Statement on the Occasion of Official Visit of the Prime Minister of Japan to India.”

¹³⁹ David M. Malone, *Does the Elephant Dance?*, 142; Shekhar Gupta, quoted in Terence Roehrig, “An Asian Triangle,” 176–77; Madhuchanda Ghosh, “India and Japan's Growing Synergy,” 301.

Most of the numbers appear to be heading in the wrong direction for those in Tokyo and New Delhi who want to see strong economic relations. Before WWII, India accounted for 10-15 percent of Japan's foreign trade.¹⁴⁰ After the war, Japan used Indian iron-ore to rebuild its economy and India was the first recipient of Japanese ODA in 1958.¹⁴¹ The divide of the Cold War and India's pursuit of import substitution stunted this relationship, even as parties in each country wanted greater ties.¹⁴² At the end of the Cold War, India began to liberalize its economy and Look East but the numbers continued to drop off. In the early 1990s India accounted for less than one percent of Japan's foreign trade while Japan was India's second biggest trading partner at 9 percent of India's trade.¹⁴³ Even after Prime Minister Mori's visit, the numbers continued to drop; the percentage of foreign imports and exports for India with Japan dropped from five percent when he visited to two percent in 2013.¹⁴⁴ While the numbers for Japan were not falling, they were also not really moving; the percentage of imports into Japan that came from India hovered around .7 percent while exports increased to just over one percent in the same timespan.¹⁴⁵ In 2008, Prime Ministers Aso and Singh stated they expected total trade between the two countries to reach \$20 billion by 2010; the actual number was just over half.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁰ Makoto Kojima, "Expanding Japan-India Economic Relations," in *India-Japan Relations in Emerging Asia*, 202.

¹⁴¹ Choudhury, "India-Japan Economic Partnership: Scope and Prospect," 223; Stuart Harris and Greg Austin, "Japan, China and Regional Order," in *Japan and China: Rivalry or Cooperation in East Asia?*, eds. Peter Drysdale and Dong Dong Zhang (Canberra, Australia: Asia Pacific Press, 2000), 158; William J. Long, "Nonproliferation as a Goal of Japanese Foreign Assistance," in *Japanese Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific: Domestic Interests, American Pressure, and Regional Integration*, eds. Akitoshi Miyashita and Yoichiro Sato (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 120.

¹⁴² Purnendra Jain, "New Roadmap for Japan-India Ties," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, September 4, 2007, <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Purnendra-Jain/2514>; Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul, *India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002), 16.

¹⁴³ Satu P. Limaye, "Sushi and Samosas: Indo-Japanese Relations After the Cold War," in *India Looks East: an Emerging Power and its Asia-Pacific Neighbours*, ed. Stephen Henningham (Canberra: Australian National University, 1995), 171.

¹⁴⁴ Export Import Database, Government of India: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

¹⁴⁵ Trade Statistics of Japan, Ministry of Finance.

¹⁴⁶ Taro Aso and Manmohan Singh, "Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation Between India and Japan."

Beyond the low trade quantity, the trade between India and Japan has also had a commensurate low quality. India's primary exports to Japan are mineral fuels, oils, and waxes; iron and steel; and "residues and waste from the food industries" while Japan's primary exports have been machinery components like boilers, marine products, jewels, and iron and steel.¹⁴⁷ These areas do not reflect the new strengths of the Indian economy, nor do they build off each other's strengths.¹⁴⁸ For example, India has developed a reputation as an information technology (IT) power and Japan's IT market is the second largest in the world; however, India's slice of that market is only .57 percent and Indian companies have had problems getting into the Japanese market.¹⁴⁹

There are brighter points in the economic ties of Japan and India. The number of Japanese companies investing in India has been steadily rising from 248 in 2006 to 812 in 2011; moreover, these companies represent an increasingly diverse set of businesses, including pharmaceuticals and electronics.¹⁵⁰ Also, the governments of India and Japan signed the CEPA in 2011. This agreement, only the third such agreement India has made, is also the most comprehensive economic agreement India has agreed to; through it tariffs on over 90 percent of goods traded between the two countries will be reduced or eliminated within 10 years of its signing.¹⁵¹ It also institutes changes that will open up the markets where the countries have previously been reluctant to do so, like generic medicines in Japan.¹⁵² While there have not been any large shifts in trade since, the CEPA was signed, many of the provisions have yet to come into full effect and its full effect will come years in the future.

Even in economic considerations, China shows up in the calculations. China became Japan's number one trading partner in 2007, and now accounts for one-fifth of

¹⁴⁷ Choudhury, "India-Japan Economic Partnership: Scope and Prospect," 226; Kojima, "Expanding Japan-India Economic Relations," 204.

¹⁴⁸ Kojima, "Expanding Japan-India Economic Relations," 204.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 212–14.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 207–10.

¹⁵¹ Choudhury, "India-Japan Economic Partnership: Scope and Prospect," 236–37.

¹⁵² Kojima, "Expanding Japan-India Economic Relations," 205.

Japan's total trade volume.¹⁵³ India is less dependent on Chinese trade, but still has strong economic ties to China. Since 2003, India's top three trading partners have been the United States, China, and the United Arab Emirates with each making close to 10 percent of India's total trade.¹⁵⁴ China is also the source of almost all of Japan's rare earth metals, used in anything with a computer chip. In 2010, China cut off shipments of rare earth metals to Japan after Japan imprisoned the fishing captain who rammed a Japanese Coast Guard cutter. Since that time, Japan has been seeking alternative sources of rare earth metals, including India, Australia, Kazakhstan, and Malaysia with the intention of importing less than 40 percent from China.¹⁵⁵

F. CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING

Cultural connections, like economic ties, have the potential to bring countries closer. Ajeet Jaiswal states, "India and Japan are no more natural allies than are India and China, if they do not learn to interact more at the people to people level."¹⁵⁶ He then adds that "a long-term relationship cannot be sustained if India and Japan do not first understand each other."¹⁵⁷ A lack of understanding has persisted due to several issues, including historical context and lack of educational opportunities; however, the lack has not kept Japan and India apart.

There is no large number of expatriates from either country in the other.¹⁵⁸ There are also fewer lower level interactions. To illustrate this paucity, Makoto Kojima compares the numbers to those of Japan-China interactions, as seen in Table 1. The study of each other's cultures is also low. Japanese studies in India, which were started in the 1920s and resumed in 1952, lacked a large number of students because there were few

¹⁵³ Trade Statistics of Japan, Ministry of Finance.

¹⁵⁴ Export Import Database, Government of India: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

¹⁵⁵ "Japan Loosens China's Grip on Rare Earth Supplies," *Reuters*, September 4, 2014, <http://www.cnbc.com/id/101973608#>.

¹⁵⁶ Jaiswal, "Changing Strategic and Global Relationship Between India and Japan," 42.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 45.

¹⁵⁸ Kojima, "Expanding Japan-India Economic Relations," 215.

jobs available.¹⁵⁹ While India doubled the number of students learning to speak Japanese from 2005 to 2010, the study of Japan beyond language has remained stagnant.¹⁶⁰ The situation is similar in Japan; Tokyo University of Foreign Studies is one of a handful of universities in Japan that teach Hindi or India area studies.¹⁶¹ One of the oldest programs for contemporary India studies in Japan was started in 2009 at Tokyo University; most of the remaining programs were started one year later in conjunction with Tokyo University's program.¹⁶²

Table 1. Human Exchanges Among Japan, India and China¹⁶³

Categories (A)	Japan-India (B)	Japan-China (C)	Ratio (C)/(B)
No. of Japanese Visitors (2009)	124,219	3,317,500	1:27
No. of Foreign Visitors to Japan (2010)	66,900	1,427,100	1:21
Students in Japan (May 2010)	546	86,173	1:158
No. of Japanese Residents (2009)	4,018	127,282	1:32
No. of People Learning Japanese Language (2009)	18,000	827,000	1:48
Sister/Friendship Cities	5 pairs	337 pairs	1:67
No. of Direct Flights (Summer 2010: Airlines)	17 per week	556 per week	1:32

The lack of strong economic or cultural connections is concerning to some, like Ghosh, Jaiswal, and Kojima; however, New Delhi and Tokyo have been able to continue

¹⁵⁹ George, "Present Status of Japanese Studies in India," 250.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 252, 256.

¹⁶¹ Hindi Studies, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, accessed October 7, 2014, <http://www.tufs.ac.jp/english/education/ug/studies/hindi.html>; Contemporary India Area Studies, National Institute for the Humanities, accessed October 7, 2014, <http://www.nihu.jp/e/sougou/areastudies/india.html>.

¹⁶² Research Seminar Archive, Contemporary India Studies: The University of Tokyo (TINDAS), accessed October 7 2014, http://www.l.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~tindas/meeting_j_tindas_past.html; The Center for Contemporary India Studies at Hiroshima University, Hiroshima University, accessed October 6, 2014, http://www.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/en/top/kenkyusyo/p_7kqmsx.html; Center for the Study of Contemporary India at Kyoto University, Kyoto University, accessed October 7, 2014, <http://www.indas.asafas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/kindas/?lang=en>; MINDAS: Minpaku Contemporary India Area Studies, National Museum of Ethnology, accessed October 7, 2014, [http://www.minpaku.ac.jp/nihu/mindas/\(English\)index.html](http://www.minpaku.ac.jp/nihu/mindas/(English)index.html); FINDAS, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, accessed October 7, 2014, <http://www.tufs.ac.jp/ts/society/findas/en/>.

¹⁶³ Kojima, "Expanding Japan-India Economic Relations," 216.

working together without these connections. While economic or cultural ties may bring Japan and India closer together, their absence has not kept the two apart.

G. CONCLUSION

In the liberal framework of international relations, trade and international institutions like ReCAAP, ASEAN, the UN, and others can create incentives for cooperation and reduce the competitive nature and uncertainty inherent in anarchy.¹⁶⁴ In the Case of Japan-India relations, there are several of these types of interactions that have the potential to bring them together or keep them apart. This chapter's survey of a number of such forums for interaction has found that evidence points to an ambivalent influence. Japan's strong backing of the nonproliferation regime, and the lack of trade and cultural interaction, all point to weaker ties. Other multilateral goals, like UNSC reform, may give the two states a commonality, but don't lend themselves to the large increase in cooperation across spheres. Finally, while institutions like ReCAAP and ASEAN can open up countries across a variety of arenas, balance of power politics can be seen in within these organizations. Thus, common participation in cooperative international forums and institutions does not appear to be a strong *independent* driver of strengthening India-Japan relations; nor has the absence of cooperation been a significant impediment.

¹⁶⁴ David A. Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 8–11.

IV. JAPAN AND THE LEGACY OF WORLD WAR II

Just as external forces have the potential to foster or hinder Japan-India relations, domestic factors have the same potential. A variety of issues, some of which have no direct bearing on international relations, can and do exert influence on countries throughout the world. For Japan, many of the issues that affect its international relations, with India and others, come from the legacy of WWII. While not an exhaustive list, this chapter discusses several Japanese domestic factors that have the potential to promote or inhibit sustained relations between Japan and India.

A. FACTORS THAT CAN PROMOTE SUSTAINED RELATIONS

After Commodore Perry arrived in Edo bay in 1853, Japan embarked on the process that would become known as the Meiji Restoration.¹⁶⁵ In the 1860s and '70s, hundreds of Japanese traveled abroad to learn about the West, and by the turn of the century, Japan was involved in international politics with signing new treaties, fighting wars, and being part of multilateral institutions like the League of Nations.¹⁶⁶ Japan experienced growing nationalism during the Meiji Restoration and up to WWII as well in response to the humiliation felt from the unequal treaties and the success Japan had in modernizing.¹⁶⁷ At the end of WWII, the Japanese receded from both international involvement and nationalism; however, both have been growing again in new ways that, along with the focus of some Prime Ministers, can strengthen Japan's ties with India.

1. International Involvement

Following Japan's defeat in WWII and a period of political maneuvering that followed, Prime Minister Yoshida and his successors in the LDP consolidated their control.¹⁶⁸ As a result, the Yoshida Doctrine became the center of Japanese foreign

¹⁶⁵ James McClain, *Japan: A Modern History* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2002), 119.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 170–171, 278–82, 295, 301, 307, 334–36.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 153, 284, 469–70.

¹⁶⁸ Gerald L. Curtis, *The Japanese Way of Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 11–18.

policy, which called for limited increases in defense spending and maintaining a small profile in international politics.¹⁶⁹ Over the past decades, however, Japan has become increasingly involved internationally; moreover, this involvement has expanded both in variety and geographically.

Initially, Japan's involvement in the world was almost entirely through its economy. Even in countries close to Japan, like those in Southeast Asia, Japan avoided involvement outside of its "economic diplomacy."¹⁷⁰ When the United States put pressure on Japan to be more involved in the 1970s, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda responded by promising economic and political involvement, but he refused to take an active military role.¹⁷¹ With riots in several ASEAN states in 1974, Japan did begin increasing its interaction beyond the economic realm; by 1977, Japan had adopted the Fukuda doctrine that equal partnerships with ASEAN states in the political and security realms.¹⁷² In 1993, Japan expanded to Africa with the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). Since that time Japan has invested in Africa's infrastructure, education, sanitation, and more, as seen in Figure 6. As Tokyo expanded its international involvement, it established the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in 1997 to enable a more comprehensive approach to international affairs.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁹ Richard Samuels, *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), Kindle edition, location 1123.

¹⁷⁰ Bhubhidar Singh, "The Evolution of Japan's Security Role in Southeast Asia," *The Round Table* 99, no. 409 (August 2010): 395.392.

¹⁷¹ Samuels, *Securing Japan*, location 1135.

¹⁷² Singh, "The Evolution of Japan's Security Role in Southeast Asia," 394.

¹⁷³ Green, *Reluctant Realism*, 32.




Figure 6. Composition of Japan's ODA to African Countries¹⁷⁴

As mentioned earlier, Prime Minister Fukuda refused to expand Japan's military role, which left Japan unprepared to meet the rapidly changing international environment after the Cold War. During Desert Storm, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) deemed sending any forces, even for the purpose of rescuing refugees, as beyond the limits of Article 9, and by the time the issue had been resolved, the conflict was over.¹⁷⁵ Many in the international community "vilified" Japan for this lack of physical support, and it "left the bitter taste of far too little, far too late" in Tokyo.¹⁷⁶ In response, Japan passed the "Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations," allowing it to cooperate in future endeavors and prevent a similar gaffe.¹⁷⁷ Just after this law passed, Japan sent 1,800 troops to Cambodia as part of a UN peacekeeping force.¹⁷⁸ Since that time, Japan has expanded the area and missions that the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) has participated in, as well as the scope of operations under its treaty with the United States, as seen in Figure 7.

¹⁷⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, *20 Years of the TICAD Process and Japan's ODA to Africa* (Tokyo: MOFA, 2013), 5, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/pamphlet/pdfs/ticad_20_en.pdf.

¹⁷⁵ Samuels, *Securing Japan*, location 1625.

¹⁷⁶ Robert Pekkanen and Ellis S. Krauss, "Japan's 'Coalition of the Willing' on Security Policies," *Orbis* 49, no 3 (Summer 2005): 429; Samuels, *Securing Japan*, location 1625.

¹⁷⁷ Samuels, *Securing Japan*, location 2242.

¹⁷⁸ Singh, "The Evolution of Japan's Security Role in Southeast Asia," 396.




Figure 7. “Expansion of the JSDF geographical Range of Dispatch”¹⁷⁹

As Japan has become more involved, it has looked for partners with experience to work with in these various endeavors in order to be more successful.¹⁸⁰ With Japan’s entry into peacekeeping and similar missions, India has the potential to be one of these partners, due to its experience in these missions. India has sent troops to 23 different countries on UN missions and is one of the highest contributors of forces.¹⁸¹ Japan can,

¹⁷⁹ Hughes, *Japan’s Re-Emergence as a Normal Military Power*, 12-13.

¹⁸⁰ Jain, “Japan’s Expanding Security Networks: India and Australia,” 4.

¹⁸¹ United Nations Peacekeeping: Troop and Police Contributors, United Nations, last modified 31 August, 2014, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>; Neha Khator, “India Deserves a Place at UN High Table,” *Deccan Herald*, March 10, 2010, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council-reform/membership-including-expansion-and-representation/48821.html?itemid=913>.

however, also work with the United States where the militaries already have strong working relations and more fully compatible equipment. Moreover, Japan has yet to create strong relations between the land component of the JSDF and the Indian Army.

Japan's growing presence in the region and internationally has brought increasing contacts with several countries. India, with its large population, democratic government, expanding economy, and strategic location, has become one of these countries; however, Japan's increasing participation did not bring the two together on its own.

2. Growing Nationalism

Japan's growing nationalism, like its growing international involvement, has the potential to increase its interaction with India. At first glance, this may seem counterintuitive; nationalism is an exclusionary concept that defines a group by what they have in common in contrast to other groups.¹⁸² For Japan, however, there are at least two reasons that nationalism can bring Japan and India closer together: pride in their country's accomplishments and the historical issue that threatens relations with China and Korea.

After WWII, Japan had to rebuild much of the country; as Jennifer Lind points out: "Japan was able to rise up from utter devastation and transform itself into one of the wealthiest, most stable, most technologically advanced, and most creative countries in the world."¹⁸³ In the 1960s, Japan had such a pollution problem that several pollution-related diseases have Japanese names; today, the World Health Organization states that Japan's cities are among the least polluted in the world.¹⁸⁴ These achievements have led many in Japan to look outward to promote similar results in other countries, and can be seen in the ODA to India, Africa, and elsewhere. Thus the pride in their achievements has led to part of Japan's expanding international involvement.

¹⁸² Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised ed. (New York: Verso, 1991), 6; Adeed Dawisha, "Nation and Nationalism: Historical Antecedents to Contemporary Debates," *International Studies Review* 4, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 3–5.

¹⁸³ Jennifer Lind, "The Perils of Apology: What Japan Shouldn't Learn From Germany," *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 3 (May/June 2009): 144.

¹⁸⁴ Alexandra Harney, "Japan's Pollution Diet," *New York Times*, February 15, 2013, http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/15/japans-pollution-diet/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.

Another element of nationalism in Japan that is not so rosy is the “history problem.”¹⁸⁵ During WWII, Japan colonized, repressed, and conscripted their neighbors, forced women to provide sex for Japanese soldiers; massacred cities; and starved, abused, enslaved, and conducted medical experiments on their prisoners.¹⁸⁶ Today, the problem is that Japan’s neighbors, specifically Korea and China, do not feel that Japan has either shown true remorse or sufficiently atoned for these atrocities; a feeling that is compounded when Japanese leaders state that these events did not happen or were not carried out by the Japanese government.¹⁸⁷ Further compounding these problems is Japan’s territorial disputes with each of these governments. Thus even as Japan’s neighbors have grown more vocal on these issues, they have also become more vocal and active in asserting their claims.

In contrast, India is a country without these complications. As Harsh Pant says, there is no “historical baggage” between Japan and India.¹⁸⁸ Instead, there are small elements of the past where Japanese see India in a positive light. For example, Radhabinod Pal served as India’s judge during the war trials; he was the only dissenting judge who argued that Japan’s actions were no worse than the victors’ and believed the war crimes trials were a way of obtaining revenge.¹⁸⁹ A monument to the Judge Pal stands outside the contentious Yasukuni Shrine, and during Prime Minister Abe’s 2007 trip to India, he traveled to Calcutta to visit the Judge’s son.¹⁹⁰ While in Calcutta, he also

¹⁸⁵ Thomas U. Berger, “The Politics of Memory in Japanese Foreign Relations,” in *Japan’s International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State*, eds. Berger, Mike M. Mochizuki, and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2007), 181.

¹⁸⁶ Lind, “The Perils of Apology,” 132; Ian Baruma, *The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1994), 112, 194.

¹⁸⁷ Lind, “The Perils of Apology,” 136–138.

¹⁸⁸ Harsh V. Pant, “The Emerging Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific,” *RUSI* 152, no. 3 (June 2007): 51, ProQuest (58778820).

¹⁸⁹ Norimitsu Onishi, “Decades After War Trials, Japan Still Honors a Dissenting Judge,” *The New York Times*, August 31, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/31/world/asia/31memo.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

visited a monument to Nobel Laureate Rabindranath Tagore, who visited Japan in the 19th century.¹⁹¹

The presence of historical animosities has affected international relations in the region. For example, while South Korea also has to contend with China's rise and a North Korean regime that is pursuing nuclear weapons and antagonistic behavior toward both Japan and South Korea, the two nations have been unable to work closely together. Other countries have, however, looked beyond the historical problems; leaders in the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia have all moved from being wary of increased Japanese military use to welcoming it.¹⁹² Likewise former Singapore President Lee Kuan Yew at one point likened having Japan take part in military action to "giving liqueur chocolates to an alcoholic," but later adopted the opinion that there was no reason to fear Japanese militarism so long as the current international system continues.¹⁹³

Ultimately, however, although lack of historical animosity does make it easier for Japan and India to work together, it does seem to be insufficient to drive Japan and India together on its own.

3. Leadership

A third factor from within Japan that has brought it closer to India has been the various prime ministers. Prime Minister Mori's visit to India was the first visit by a Japanese Prime Minister in 10 years, and since 2005, Japan's Prime Minister has met with India's Prime Minister every year.¹⁹⁴ Among these meetings, there are a few points of note.

Prime Minister Mori called India and Japan "global partners," a phrase previously reserved for the United States, as he started to create a relationship beyond the nuclear

¹⁹¹ Jain, "New Roadmap for Japan-India Ties," 2–3.

¹⁹² Sueo Sudo, "Japan's ASEAN Policy: Reactive or Proactive in the Face of a Rising China in East Asia?," *Asian Perspective* 33, no. 1 (2009): 149.

¹⁹³ Singh, "The Evolution of Japan's Security Role in Southeast Asia," 398.

¹⁹⁴ Japan-India Relations (Basic Data), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

problem.¹⁹⁵ In 2009, when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won control of Japan's government, they did not change tack; instead, Prime Minister Hatoyama visited India early in his tenure and "discussed ways to expand, enhance and strengthen the India–Japan Strategic and Global Partnership."¹⁹⁶

No Japanese Prime Minister has pushed for the Japan-India connection more than Shinzo Abe. As noted previously, he has travelled parts of India and honored people from India's past. Abe was allowed to address a joint session of the Indian Parliament, an honor that not even President Bush or Chinese General Secretary Hu Jintao were given.¹⁹⁷ In his book *Utsukushii Kuni e (Towards a Beautiful Country)*, he wrote that India was important for Japan's future and that Japan's relations with China and the U.S. would be overtaken by its relationship with India.¹⁹⁸ While this has not happened as quickly as he supposed, it is not because of a lack of effort on his part. For example, the CEPA that went into effect was started during Abe's first term as Prime Minister.¹⁹⁹ More recently, Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko visited India, marking the first visit to India by a Japanese Emperor; this visit was advised by Prime Minister Abe and could signal an even stronger emphasis to come.²⁰⁰ Abe has also known Narendra Modi since 2007 and "has long been a favorite" of Abe.²⁰¹ With the election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in India, the two could be positioned to further increase and cement the relationship between their two countries.

¹⁹⁵ Jain, "Westward Ho! Japan Eyes India Strategically," 17; Kesavan, *India and Japan: Changing Dimensions of Partnership*, 9–10.

¹⁹⁶ Jain, "Japan-India Relations: Peaks and Troughs," 409.

¹⁹⁷ Jain, "New Roadmap for Japan-India Ties," 2.

¹⁹⁸ Shinzo Abe, *Utsukushii Kuni e* (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 2006), 260, quoted in Jain, "Westward Ho! Japan Eyes India Strategically," 18.

¹⁹⁹ Jijo Jacob, "India-Japan Free Trade Agreement: A Win-Win Deal," *International Business Times*, February 16, 2011, <http://www.ibtimes.com/india-japan-free-trade-agreement-win-win-deal-267457>.

²⁰⁰ Sachin Parashar, "Emperor Akihito's Visit Shows Shift in India-Japan Relations," *Times of India*, November 28, 2013, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Emperor-Akihitos-visit-shows-shift-in-India-Japan-relations/articleshow/26490469.cms>.

²⁰¹ Bruce Einhorn and Bhuma Shrivastava, "Japan's Best Friend," *Bloomberg Businessweek*, April 10, 2014, <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-04-10/india-under-narendra-modi-could-be-japans-best-friend>.

When Abe left office the first time, Japan-India relations did not regress or stagnate, but the relation's progress did slow considerably. While Abe's second tenure in office continues, Japan-India relations should continue to grow; however, Abe's current tenure is already longer than those of every Prime Minister since Koizumi, including Abe's previous term.²⁰² When he leaves office, the priority his successor attaches to Japan-India relations could easily change. But all previous prime ministers since Mori, of both the LDP and DPJ, have supported some level of continued strengthening of relations. If these tendencies continue, relations are not likely to go off track without some other input.

B. FACTORS THAT CAN INHIBIT SUSTAINED RELATIONS

Beyond the decline in nationalism and Japan's involvement in world affairs, WWII left Japan another legacy that can hinder their defense relations with most countries including India. That legacy is the pacifism that Japan adopted at the end of the war, which sets a limit to the level of military cooperation and has formed the basis of some of Japan's foreign policies. The three biggest barriers to greater military cooperation are: Article 9 of Japan's constitution, the military export restrictions that Tokyo has imposed, and nuclear weapons.

1. Article 9

In the Constitution of Japan, between the chapters regarding the Emperor and the people, is the chapter, "Renunciation of War," with just one article:

Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

²⁰² Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, Japan Kantei, last modified September 3, 2014, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/meibo/daijin/index_e.html; "Experts Ponder Reasons for Japan's Rash of Short-Term Prime Ministers," *Japan Times*, January 1, 2012, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/01/01/national/experts-ponder-reasons-for-japans-rash-of-short-term-prime-ministers/#.VEW1Joe4mT8>.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.²⁰³

This article is at the center of the debate regarding Japan's use of the JSDF and part of the framework for Japan's security, alongside the US treaty.²⁰⁴ Prime Minister Yoshida and his successors used Article 9 to prevent becoming entangled in US wars; it also prevented Japan from being able to contribute, beyond monetary support, to Operation Desert Storm.²⁰⁵ There are two approaches that politicians in Tokyo have looked at for dealing with Article 9: interpretation and constitutional revision.

The first, interpreting the meaning of Article 9, has been used at various times in the past. Shidehara Kijuro, the presumed author of the article, argued that it banned any military capabilities or the participation in any war; but interpretation eventually fell to the cabinet and the CLB with the first official interpretation from Yoshida's CLB that allowed Japan to resist invasion.²⁰⁶ Subsequent Prime Ministers have similarly used this ability, including Nobusuke Kishi, Sato Eisaku, Suzuki Zenko, and others, but it is limited.²⁰⁷ First, it has generally taken time to generate a reinterpretation, and any opposed to such a move can either delay it longer or prevent further changes, as happened in 1991. The citizens of Japan can also force the resignation of a Prime Minister who they see as going too far with revision, as was done to Kishi.²⁰⁸ The second limit comes from the wording of Article 9 itself. To date, politicians have been able to work around the wording, but they have done so when using the JSDF for peacekeeping missions. Renouncing "the threat or use of force" and "the right of belligerency" can only be

²⁰³ "The Constitution of Japan," Chapter II, Article 9, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.

²⁰⁴ Akihiko Tanaka, "Japan's Security Policy in the 1990s," in *Japan's International Agenda*, ed. Yōichi Funabashi (New York University Press, 1994), 29.

²⁰⁵ Green, *Reluctant Realism*, 12; Samuels, *Securing Japan*, location 858, 1621–1645.

²⁰⁶ Samuels, *Securing Japan*, location 1178, 1190.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 1521.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

interpreted so far.²⁰⁹ Thus these two constraints work together to limit the effectiveness of further reinterpretation of Article 9.

The second method for working with Article 9 is not really working with it, but rather rewriting it. This, however, is a daunting plan, as the Japanese constitution has yet to be amended. Article 96 of the constitution requires a two-thirds majority in each house, followed by a simple majority in a referendum or general election.²¹⁰ Abe is the most recent to try for the elusive goal; however, the LDP's partner New Komeito, as well as members of the LDP, are reluctant. Rare street protests and a general dissatisfaction with the move have forced Abe to slow down.²¹¹

While Japan and India focus on maritime security, exercises, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and other similar facets, Article 9 does not impact their relations. Other forms of military cooperation, to include collective security, become more difficult. In 2014, Abe has begun another round of interpretations to allow some collective security, but even here he states: "What the Constitution allows for are only self-defense measures to maintain the existence of our country and protect our people. We will not use force for the sole purpose of defending a foreign country." Thus Abe is willing to aid an ally if the conflict they are involved in threatens Japan but has not yet involved Japan. To date collective security has not been an issue for India and Japan; moreover, with India's negative response to explicitly back the Philippines and Vietnam in their territorial disputes with China and its desires to remain free from alliances, it appears that India is currently not interested in collective security arrangements.

Article 9 is likely to remain a factor for the foreseeable future, which means Japan will be limited in what it can offer India, or any other country, in terms of security cooperation. Moreover, the Japanese people do not appear likely to give up their pacifist stance. As long as India and Japan continue in their present course, Article 9 should not

²⁰⁹ "The Constitution of Japan," Chapter II, Article 9.

²¹⁰ "The Constitution of Japan," Chapter IX, Article 96.

²¹¹ Jeremy A. Yellen, "Shinzo Abe's Constitutional Ambitions," *The Diplomat*, June 12, 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/shinzo-abes-constitutional-ambitions/>; Makiko Inoue and Neil Gough, "Polls Slow Japan's Plan to Revise Constitution," *The New York Times*, July 9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/10/world/asia/polls-slow-japans-plan-to-revise-constitution.html?_r=0.

impact their relationship; however, if circumstances change and India begins to seek mutual aid, Japan will be unable to respond quickly, if at all, with Article 9 in place.

2. Military Export Restrictions

Article 9 prohibits Japan from threatening war or possessing beyond the level of weapons granted in whatever interpretation is in force. It does not, however, restrict manufacturing weapons and exporting them.²¹² As the pacifist nature of Japan grew, however, the politicians in Tokyo added the self-imposed restraint of restricting arms exports.²¹³ This policy has been in place for almost 50 years and places another restriction on defense and strategic cooperation with other countries, including India.

In 1967, the Japanese Diet declared the “Three Principles of Arms Exports,” prohibiting arms exports to the following countries:

1. communist block countries,
2. countries subject to “arms” exports embargo under the United Nations Security Council's resolutions, and
3. countries involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts.²¹⁴

Ten years later, Tokyo further restricted arms exports to all countries, regardless of destination, to be “in conformity with Japan’s position as a peace-loving nation.”²¹⁵ Further, the classification of arms technology was so strict that the PlayStation 2 was subject to the three principles due to its advanced processor, requiring a special permit before Sony was allowed to export it.²¹⁶ India has difficulty meeting the initial principles, not to mention the broader ban, due to its border disputes with China and Pakistan and military intervention in Sri Lanka.

²¹² Samuels, *Securing Japan*, location 863.

²¹³ Tanaka, “Japan’s Security Policy in the 1990s,” 31.

²¹⁴ Japan’s Policies on the Control of Arms Exports, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, accessed October 1, 2014, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/>.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ “Export of PlayStation 2 Prohibited without Government Permission,” *Nanaimo Daily News*, March 9, 2000, ProQuest (361072591).

Recently, however, there have been signs that Japan is reconsidering its position. Before the twenty-first century, the United States was the only exception to this rule, and the exception was made under US pressure and to allow collaboration on the FS-X fighter.²¹⁷ As the new century got underway, Japan began to soften further; Japan began joint development with the United States on a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system that would require not only knowledge but components transfer.²¹⁸ Beyond its U.S. ally, Japan also sent equipment to Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines for rescue and maritime patrol operations as part of Tokyo's anti-piracy campaign.²¹⁹ While rescue equipment may not sound like arms, the coast guard cutters that Indonesia received in 2007, that Vietnam is receiving, that the Philippines are in closed talks to get, and Djibouti, Kenya, and Tanzania are looking at do have direct military potential.²²⁰ Some of these countries have border disputes that could lead to conflict, and Vietnam, as a communist state, is definitely covered in the three principles, but Japan has still seen fit to send ships or consider doing so.

India is also a beneficiary of this opening policy. In December 2013, a Joint Working Group met to discuss the sale of the Japanese US-2 amphibian aircraft, seen in Figure 8, to India.²²¹ This airplane can serve as a search and rescue, surveillance, and resupply platform that can land in rough seas and has an impressive range of 4,500 km.²²² This move goes further than the coast guard ships for two reasons. First, the US-2 deal may now include provisions for India to produce part of the aircraft, creating new

²¹⁷ Mark A. Lorell, *Troubled Partnership: A History of U.S.-Japan Collaboration on the FS-X Fighter* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1995), 20.

²¹⁸ Norifumi Namatame, "Japan's Ballistic Missile Defense System," *East Asia Forum*, February 8, 2012, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/02/08/japan-s-ballistic-missile-defence-system/>.

²¹⁹ Manabu Sasaki and Yoshihiro Makino, "Japan Coast Guard Vessels and Equipment in High Demand in S.E. Asia, Africa," *The Asahi Shimbun*, September 30, 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/around_asia/AJ201309300001.

²²⁰ Ibid.; Ankit Panda, "Vietnam to Acquire Japanese Maritime Surveillance Ships," *The Diplomat*, August 2, 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/vietnam-to-acquire-japanese-maritime-surveillance-ships/>.

²²¹ Abe and Singh, "Joint Statement on the Occasion of Official Visit."

²²² Ankit Panda, "India Will Buy 15 Amphibious Aircraft From Japan: So What?," *The Diplomat*, January 29, 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/india-will-buy-15-amphibious-aircraft-from-japan-so-what/>.

economic and development ties.²²³ Second, because the US-2 is part of the JSDF inventory, some view it as the first time Japan has exported arms since the Three Principles were released in 1967, while others, including Japanese defense officials, insist that the dual use nature and lack of armaments keep it within the three principles.²²⁴



Figure 8. US-2 Amphibious Aircraft²²⁵

The development of the US-2 deal is a start for Japan-India military procurement cooperation. It also shows parallels to constitutional interpretation; while the Three Principles of Arms Exports has not been changed, its implementation has been softened. Where the Japanese once required special permission to export game consoles due to their dual use capability, now military aircraft can be exported as long as they don't have guns or bombs. While this is a start, there is much more room for cooperation; moreover, the Three Principles are still in place, making cooperation more difficult to achieve.

²²³ Atul Chandra, "India Looks to Acquire 18 ShinMaywa US-2 Amphibians," *Flight Global*, September 4, 2014, <http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/india-looks-to-acquire-18-shinmaywa-us-2-amphibians-403341/>; "Japan May Allow India to Produce Parts for US-2 Amphibious Aircraft," *The Japan Times*, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/08/13/national/japan-may-allow-india-produce-parts-us-2-amphibious-aircraft/#.VEk4_Ye4mT8.

²²⁴ Panda, "India Will Buy 15 Amphibious Aircraft From Japan: So What?"; Vivek Mishra, "The Benefits for India of a US-2 Deal with Japan," *The Diplomat*, October 24, 2013, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/the-benefits-for-india-of-a-us-2-deal-with-japan/>; Kosuke Takahashi, "Japan-India Agree to Push for US-2 Amphibian Deal," *Jane's*, January 6, 2014, <http://www.janes.com/article/32120/japan-india-agree-to-push-for-us-2-amphibian-deal>.

²²⁵ JMSDF US-2 details, Ministry of Defense, accessed February 24, 2014, <http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/formal/gallery/aircraft/kyunan/details/us-2.html>.

3. Nuclear Weapons

The issue of nuclear weapons is an international one through the nonproliferation regime, but in many countries it can also be a powerful domestic one. With Japan being the only country to have nuclear weapons used against them, it can be a particularly strong domestic issue that potentially stands in the way of closer ties with India after India armed itself with nuclear weapons.

Japan has held to its non-nuclear stance fairly consistently for over half a century. In 1957, Prime Minister Kishi declared that Japan had no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons.²²⁶ Prime Minister Sato Eisaku strengthened the non-nuclear stance 10 years later by announcing the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles: non-possession, non-production, and non-introduction.”²²⁷ In 2006, Japan released its latest disarmament policy and non-proliferation policy; the first sentence reads: “The year 2005 marked the sixtieth anniversary of the horrific atomic bombings suffered by Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.”²²⁸ Further, the first reason Japan gives for pursuing disarmament and non-proliferation is that Japan “has responsibility for demonstrating the devastation of nuclear weapons as the only state that has suffered the horrific effects of atomic bombs.”²²⁹ It thus appears that Japan’s non-nuclear principles remain unchanged and tied to its WWII experience.

While Prime Minister Mori’s visit opened the door for more interaction and closer ties, nuclear weapons remain a thorn in Japan-India relations.²³⁰ Japan lifted some of its sanctions in 2000, but others remained until this year. In 2008, Tokyo “reluctantly” agreed to India’s Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver, but remains skeptical of the US

²²⁶ Samuels, *Securing Japan*, location 1219.

²²⁷ Ibid., location 4268; Horimoto, “The Japan-India Nuclear Agreement: Enhancing Bilateral Agreement?”

²²⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Japan’s Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy*, 3rd ed. (Tokyo: MOFA, 2006), 1, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/pamph0603.html>.

²²⁹ MOFA, *Japan’s Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy*, 10.

²³⁰ Bhaskar Balakrishnan, “The Nuclear Thorn in India-Japan Ties,” *The Hindu Business Line*, September 5, 2014, <http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/the-nuclear-thorn-in-india-japan-ties/article6383865.ece>.

nuclear deal with India.²³¹ When Prime Minister Singh met with Prime Minister Fukuda to discuss Japan's support for the waiver, Fukuda told him: "We will consider it, but we hope you will respond appropriately to what the international community, including our country, is concerned about," which refers back to Japan's repeated requests that India sign the CTBT and the NPT.²³² Japan did not get any guarantees concerning the treaties, but the U.S. deal did have safeguards to prevent foreign nuclear supplies ending up in Indian nuclear weapons. This includes verification visits that track fuel from foreign suppliers throughout their use in India's reactors; however, these measures have yet to be implemented, which is one reason for Japan's doubts regarding the U.S.-India nuclear deal.²³³

Even with Japan's agreement to the waiver, India's ability to strike deals with other countries for nuclear power is limited because of Japan's corner on certain markets. For instance, 80 percent of large forged components for nuclear reactors are produced by Japan Steel Works.²³⁴ Talks for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries did start in 2010; however, the Fukushima Daiichi accident following the Tsunami in March 2011 caused the negotiations to be suspended until 2013.²³⁵ Two sticking points in the negotiations are Japan's insistence that spent fuel be returned to Japan for processing and that any reactor components that come from Japan be returned if India tests another nuclear weapon.²³⁶ For Japan, these measures reduce the risk of indirectly supporting nuclear weapons; however, India has concerns regarding the safety and feasibility of

²³¹ Horimoto, "The Japan-India Nuclear Agreement: Enhancing Bilateral Agreement?"

²³² "India Seeks Support for N-Deal From Australia, Japan," *Economic Times*, July 9, 2008, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2008-07-09/news/28463992_1_indo-us-nuclear-deal-united-states-and-india-nuclear-suppliers-group.

²³³ Indrani Bagchi, "US Holds the Key to India's Civil Nuclear Programme," *Economic Times*, September 24, 2014, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-09-24/news/54279515_1_india-s-nuclear-deal-nuclear-agreement.

²³⁴ Horimoto, "The Japan-India Nuclear Agreement: Enhancing Bilateral Agreement?"

²³⁵ "India, Japan Continue Talks on Nuclear Deal," *World Nuclear News*, September 3, 2014, <http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-India-Japan-continue-talks-on-nuclear-deal-0309144.html>; Ankit Panda, "The Nuclear Problem in India-Japan Relations," *The Diplomat*, October 31, 2013, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/the-nuclear-problem-in-india-japan-relations/>.

²³⁶ Jaiswal, "Changing Strategic and Global Relationship Between India and Japan," 42, 45.

transporting these components due to the radioactive contamination entailed.²³⁷ Another issue is Japan's insistence that all of the U.S.-India deal be implemented, which could also reduce the possibility of Japanese supplies ending up in India's nuclear weapons, but is contingent on the United States.²³⁸ While Japan may have opened up toward India and is moving forward in other areas of their relationship, nuclear issues are still a sticking point.

There are elements within Japan that have a different view on nuclear weapons. Some of these have been around for a while; for instance when Prime Minister Kishi announced that Japan would not pursue nuclear weapons in 1957, he also succeeded in getting the CLB to state that acquiring them would not be unconstitutional.²³⁹ The Japanese government has been open enough to nuclear weapons itself that it conducted studies considering acquiring nuclear weapons on four occasions: after China's 1964 nuclear test, before ratifying the NPT, when the NPT's indefinite extension was approaching, and most recently during the North Korean nuclear crisis.²⁴⁰ Each of these times, however, it was considered both domestically and internationally to be in Japan's best interest to remain nuclear free.²⁴¹ In the last decade, the arguments that Japan needs to consider nuclear weapons have become more open. For example, Nishibe Susumu stated that Japan should either become the fifty-first state or "assert its independence and go nuclear" while Nakanishi Terumasa feels Japan should acquire nuclear weapons if China's navy can threaten Okinawa or the Senkaku Islands.²⁴² Finally, in 2011, the *Sankei Shimbun*, a right leaning newspaper in Japan, reported a survey where 86.7 percent of Japanese felt that the diet should have discuss the possibilities of acquiring nuclear weapons.²⁴³ But while more voices have begun calling for nuclear weapons and

²³⁷ Balakrishnan, "The Nuclear Thorn in India-Japan Ties."

²³⁸ Bagchi, "US Holds the Key to India's Civil Nuclear Programme."

²³⁹ Samuels, *Securing Japan*, location 4271.

²⁴⁰ Maria Rost Rublee, "The Future of Japanese Nuclear Policy," *Strategic Insights* 8, no. 2 (April 2009): <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/11379>.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Samuels, *Securing Japan*, location 2943, 2981.

²⁴³ Horimoto, "The Japan-India Nuclear Agreement: Enhancing Bilateral Agreement?"

more of the population is open to discussing them, it does not mean that there is strong support for nuclear weapons or nuclear power at home or abroad. National polls before Fukushima showed nearly two-thirds of Japan supported nuclear power, where now nearly 60 percent oppose restarting Japan's nuclear plants.²⁴⁴

While there has been talk in Japan about changing its nuclear stance, it has never gone beyond the discussion. Moreover, with the renewed negativity and attention after Fukushima, Japan's leadership cannot drift too far from public opinion. Both the official statements and delays in a civil-nuclear agreement with India indicate that Tokyo will likely not change their position on nuclear proliferation or acquisition anytime soon. This position, in turn, will keep a wedge between Japan and India, at least on nuclear cooperation and power production.

C. CONCLUSION

Within Japanese domestic politics, there are elements that can both pull India closer and push it away. Japan's increasing activism on the world stage and its increasing nationalism, along with the vision of various leaders, have complemented other factors that drive India and Japan closer together. Moreover, Japan's pacifist culture that developed since WWII does not appear to have interfered with Japan's growing security cooperation with India. The anti-nuclear movement in Japan has rebounded since Fukushima, possibly providing more resistance to nuclear cooperation. While the absence of a nuclear deal has not blocked other elements of Japan and India's interaction, it does have the potential to poison the well if Japan's reticence prevents India from gaining nuclear power technology and power plants from other countries as well.

²⁴⁴ Daniel Aldrich and James Platte, "After the Fukushima Meltdown, Japan's Nuclear Restart is Stalled," *Washington Post*, August 15, 2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/08/15/after-the-fukushima-meltdown-japans-nuclear-restart-is-stalled/>.

V. INDIA

India is home to 1.2 billion people who are divided by multiple ethnicities, religions, and languages.²⁴⁵ India is also a democracy where each of these different groups seeks to be heard, causing an array of issues. Some of these factors have already been discussed in other contexts, like India's nuclear program. There are other elements, however, that have not been covered in the previous chapters; therefore, this chapter discusses these domestic factors and their ability to influence sustained relations between Japan and India.

A. FACTORS THAT CAN PROMOTE SUSTAINED RELATIONS

During the Cold War, New Delhi attempted to remain neutral; it traded with both sides, remained a member of the British Commonwealth, and maintained an independent foreign policy. India supported the communist insurgency in Vietnam and anti-communist forces in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Burma based on the nationalist nature of each.²⁴⁶ The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation in 1971, however, moved them more towards the USSR as the Cold War progressed. When the Iron Curtain fell, India realized that its relationship with regional powers like China, Japan, and the United States were underdeveloped and its economy was dragging.²⁴⁷ As mentioned previously, India began to liberalize its economy. At the same time, India began looking out as it grew, looking east for new engagement, and endeavoring to develop its infrastructure.

1. Looking Out: India's Rising Power Status

For many in India, their country has either always been a great power or destined to become one. According to Nehru, India was a world power, not because of military

²⁴⁵ Ethnicity of India, Government of India, last modified December 9, 2012, http://www.archive.india.gov.in/nowindia/culture_heritage.php?id=70.

²⁴⁶ Nanda, "Introduction," *Indian Foreign Policy: the Nehru Years*, 6–7; D. R. Sardesai, "India and Southeast Asia," in *Indian Foreign Policy: the Nehru Years*, 81–84.

²⁴⁷ C. Raja Mohan, "India and the Balance of Power," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 4 (2006): ProQuest (214291589).

strength, but because it was a leader against war and poverty.²⁴⁸ Former Cabinet Foreign Service Officer Pavan Varma stated: “We [Indians] are emerging slowly as an important face in the area of politics, economics and the military. In the field of culture, however, we have always been a superpower, given our civilizational depth and antiquity.”²⁴⁹ But while Indian leaders may have felt that India had a place among the great powers, they have not always been able to assert that role internationally.

Initially, India tried to become the leader of an independent Asia and a larger non-aligned movement throughout the world; however, the Sino-Indian war and strength of the U.S. and USSR impeded India’s goal. Following these events India focused on more immediate security concerns, including fighting Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 and dealing with various separatist movements throughout India.²⁵⁰ After the Cold War, India began to reach out again, becoming involved in multilateral forums, including some that have already been mentioned. India also reached out bilaterally; as seen in Figure 9, India more than doubled its bilateral defense agreements in the 1990s before almost tripling them the next decade. These connections include European nations like Poland, Ukraine, Italy, and Germany; African states like Madagascar and Nigeria; and many of their neighbors, and as seen in Table 2.

²⁴⁸ Robert W. Bradnock, *India’s Foreign Policy Since 1971* (New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990), 109.

²⁴⁹ Pavan Varma, quoted in Malone, *Does the Elephant Dance?*, 222.

²⁵⁰ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, 43, 67; Subir Bhaumik, “Ethnicity, Ideology, and Religion: Separatist Movements in India’s Northeast,” in *Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia*, eds. Satu Limaye, et al. (Honolulu, Hawaii: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), 219–44, <http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/ReligiousRadicalism/PagesfromReligiousRadicalismandSecurityinSouthAsiach10.pdf>.




Figure 9. India's Bilateral Defense Agreements²⁵¹

As India has grown, it has been drawn into world politics as Satyavrata Patel said might happen with the passage of time and growing strength.²⁵² This expansion of India's outreach has included Japan. Just as India-Japan relations began to improve in 2000, India's Minister of Defense Mr. Hernandez visited Japan; three years later, the Ishiba, Japan's Minister of State for Defense visited India.²⁵³ Japan and India share in exercises and delegations, forums, and agreements like many of the other countries listed in Table 2. In short, India's efforts to expand international connections in keeping with its self-image as an important and growing global power has been one driver of enhanced relations with Japan.

²⁵¹ Hendrick, *India's Strategic Defense Transformation*, 41.

²⁵² Satyavrata Ramdas Patel, *Foreign Policy of India: An Inquiry and Criticism* (Bombay: Tripathi, 1960), 259.

²⁵³ "Japan-India Relations (Basic Data)," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

Table 2. India's Defense Relationships²⁵⁴

Relationship	Countries
Defense Cooperation	Australia, Brazil, Cambodia, China, France, Germany, Japan, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Oman, Poland, Qatar, Russia, South Africa, Ukraine, UAE, U.S., and eight ASEAN states
Information Sharing or Protection	Australia, Germany, Israel, and Myanmar
Defense Equipment	France, Italy, Russia, South Africa, Japan, South Korea, United Kingdom (UK), U.S., Uzbekistan, and Vietnam
Overseas Basing	Madagascar and Tajikistan
Military Training	Singapore
Coast Guard Cooperation	Japan and South Korea
Bilateral Forums	Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mozambique, Oman, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, UAE, UK, and U.S.
Delegations to India	Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Oman, Poland, Qatar, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Tajikistan, UAE, UK, U.S., and five ASEAN states
Exercises	Australia, Brazil, China, France, Israel, Japan, Oman, Russia, South Africa, Tajikistan, UK, U.S., and eight ASEAN states
Defense Sales	Brazil, France, Germany, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Poland, Russia, UK, and U.S.

2. Looking East

The British had been active in Southeast Asia during its colonial era, making India active in the region as well, but after independence and India's economy turned inward, India maintained less interaction with most states of the region. After the end of the Cold War, India adopted its Look East policy and New Delhi again became involved in Southeast Asia. Economically, the 10 countries in ASEAN make up roughly the same amount of trade as China, the U.S. or UAE.²⁵⁵ Politically, India became increasingly

²⁵⁴ Hendrick, *India's Strategic Defense Transformation*, 61–67; Das, "India's Defense-Related Agreements with ASEAN States," 123–129; Das, "India's Naval Exercises with ASEAN States Since 1991," 130–133.

²⁵⁵ "Annual Report 2012–2013," Government of India: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, accessed 10 November, 2014, http://commerce.nic.in/publications/annualreport_chapter6-2012-13.asp.

involved in ASEAN, as previously discussed.²⁵⁶ Bilaterally, India has also increased relations with most ASEAN members; while initially focused on economic relations in Southeast Asia, India now has defense related agreements and conducts naval exercises with the majority of ASEAN states, as seen in Table 2.

While much of India's Look East policy initially focused on Southeast Asia, this expanded to other states to India's east, including South Korea, Australia, China, and Japan. India has been building defense (as seen in Table 2), political, and economic relations with all four of these countries as it builds ties and influence in the region and around the world. Thus, the Look East policy, informed by India's own historical legacy as much as geostrategic considerations, has provided additional impetus to its outreach to Japan.

3. India's Development

India has faced endemic development challenges since its independence. According to the World Bank, 24.7 percent of Indians live below the poverty line of \$1.25 a day in PPP.²⁵⁷ The Global Slavery Index states that over 14 million Indians live in slavery, which it defines as "one person depriving another person of their freedom," whether as forced marriage, exploitation of children, forced prostitution, or other activities.²⁵⁸ This places one-third of the world's poor and slave population within India.²⁵⁹ Indian politicians have been working to combat this problem for some time; 20 years ago nearly 50 percent of Indians lived below the poverty line.²⁶⁰ Prime Minister Modi is continuing

²⁵⁶ David Brewster, "India's Defense Strategy and the India-ASEAN Relationship," *India Review* 12, no. 3 (2013): 152.

²⁵⁷ "Poverty and Equity Data: India," World Bank, accessed November 20, 2014, <http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/IND>.

²⁵⁸ *The Global Slavery Index: 2014* (Claremont, Australia: Hope for Children Organization, Australia, 2014), 10–11, 33, <http://www.globalslaveryindex.org>.

²⁵⁹ Ram Mashru, "India's Growing Urban Poverty Crisis," *Diplomat*, March 4, 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/indias-growing-urban-poverty-crisis/>.

²⁶⁰ "India: Data," World Bank, accessed November 20, 2014, <http://data.worldbank.org/country/india>.

this pursuit by various means, including his plan to have power in every home in India and sufficient power for farming, business, and manufacturing in five years.²⁶¹

Japan, as one of the world's more advanced nations, is in a good position to help India with such projects. Japan has sent more ODA to India than any other country since 2003.²⁶² Beyond loans, the ODA has also shifted over the years from grants to technical aid, as seen in Figure 10, which has a higher potential of making India's economy more efficient. From 2000 to 2010, Japan gave India over \$25 billion in loans and \$755 million in grants, as seen in Table 3.²⁶³ In 2010 alone, Japan's ODA included over \$152 million for the Andhra Pradesh Rural High Voltage Distribution System for energy infrastructure, over \$364 million for rail, road, and mass transit systems, and several other projects seen in Figure 11.²⁶⁴ When Prime Minister Modi visited Japan in 2014, Prime Minister Abe increased Japan's ODA by promising aid and loans totaling \$35 billion over the next five years, including bullet trains, industrial corridors, environmental cleaning, and more.²⁶⁵

²⁶¹ "How Modi Government Plans to Provide 24*7 Power: Eight Steps," *Economic Times*, September 8, 2014. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-09-08/news/53691309_1_coal-minister-piyush-goyal-coal-regulator-coal-output

²⁶² Kojima, "Expanding Japan-India Economic Relations," 201.

²⁶³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, *Overview of Japan's ODA to India* (Tokyo: MOFA, 2011), 2, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/region/sw_asia/india_o.pdf.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 1, 3.

²⁶⁵ "10 Highlights of Modi's Visit to Japan," *India Today*, September 3, 2014, <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/10-highlights-of-modi-visit-to-japan/1/380647.html>.




Figure 10. Japan's ODA for India by Scheme²⁶⁶

²⁶⁶ Pravakar Sahoo, "Infrastructure Development in India: Role of Japanese ODA" (presentation, Ministry of Finance, 2013), 40, https://www.mof.go.jp/pri/international_exchange/visiting_scholar_program/ws2013_b.pdf.




Figure 11. Japan's Main ODA Projects in FY 2010²⁶⁷

²⁶⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, *Overview of Japan's ODA to India*, 3.

Table 3. Japan's ODA for India by Scheme (million dollars)²⁶⁸

Fiscal Year	ODA Loan	Grant Aid	Technical Cooperation
2000	1.601	0.155	0.076
2001	5.555	0.121	0.086
2002	9.411	0.077	0.081
2003	10.575	0.148	0.087
2004	11.376	0.253	0.082
2005	13.151	0.178	0.071
2006	15.642	0.050	0.111
2007	19.046	0.034	0.104
2008	19.969	0.036	0.100
2009	18.467	0.032	0.157
2010	17.221	0.098	Not Available
Total	142.014	1.182	0.955

By moving closer to Japan, New Delhi has been able to further improve the infrastructure throughout India, which helps improve the quality of life for the population. As seen by the large numbers of poor or repressed people in India, there is still much that can be done; however, India has taken steps to alleviate some of the problems and much of this has been possible through Japan-India relations.

B. NEHRUVIANISM AND NON-ALIGNMENT

In international relations theory, there are various theories or groups of theories, like realism and liberalism; in India, the theories predominately subscribed to are these two and a third that is called Nehruvianism.²⁶⁹ According to those who describe themselves as Nehruvians, “states and people can come to understand each other better, and thereby make and sustain peace.”²⁷⁰ It is influenced by the ideals of Nehru, hence the

²⁶⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, *Overview of Japan's ODA to India*, 2.

²⁶⁹ Kanti Bajpai, “India and the World,” in *The Oxford Companion to Politics in India*, 521.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 522.

name, and the non-violent tenets of Mahatma Gandhi.²⁷¹ The concept has some commonalities with liberalism, including a belief that the threat of war can be mitigated or eliminated through international institutions and law, but also by “cooperation, free intercourse between societies, and regard for the well-being of people everywhere.” Nehruvians, moreover, hold that preparing for war is “ruinous and futile” because it takes resources away from other endeavors while not preventing war.²⁷² As Japan and India’s recent relationship growth has been most active in defense cooperation, much of the India-Japan connection has yet to express Nehruvian principles.

At the same time, Nehruvians see nuclear weapons as “an abomination” and universal disarmament as an achievable goal.²⁷³ This aim holds well with Japan’s strong support of nonproliferation and could bring this group closer to Japan. Nehruvians, however, also see the NPT as discriminatory and advocate not signing it, where the Japanese see the NPT and CTBT as a pathway to universal disarmament.

Another point that Nehruvians hold to is nonalignment. Nonalignment does not mean non-involvement; instead, Nehru described it: “as far as possible to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which has led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disaster on an even vaster scale.”²⁷⁴ For some Nehruvians, the U.S. is still an imperialist power that has to be countered.²⁷⁵ This too can complicate India-Japan relations, as Japan is still a treaty ally of the United States. For others, however, nonalignment is less about opposing the major powers and more about “having no prior commitment coupled with dynamic participation in world affairs.”²⁷⁶ To this group, establishing relationships with countries throughout the world, including Japan and the United States, is desirable, so long as no ironclad treaties are entered into that would bind India’s options.

²⁷¹ Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya, *The Making of India’s Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Processes and Personalities* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1970), 67–69.

²⁷² Bajpai, “India and the World,” 522.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, 525.

²⁷⁴ Jawaharlal Nehru, quoted in Nanda, “Introduction,” *Indian Foreign Policy: the Nehru Years*, 3.

²⁷⁵ Bajpai, “India and the World,” 538.

²⁷⁶ Patel, *Foreign Policy of India: An Inquiry and Criticism*, 24.

After Nehru's time, Indian foreign policy has tended to move toward more pragmatism, realism, or liberalism. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation, India's nuclear weapons program, growing military, and more are all examples of this trend. While the Nehruvian influence appears to be diminishing, it can still be a factor in Indian politics. In May of 2014, Sonia Gandhi, president of India's Congress Party, stated that the pillars of Nehruvianism, which includes nonalignment, formed the core of the party's beliefs despite their being challenged within Indian politics.²⁷⁷ At the same time, however, Sonia Gandhi also admitted that the application of Nehruvian principles has to change. Similarly, in 2012 a group of Indian analysts and policy makers drafted a document titled *Nonalignment 2.0*, which advocated a variety of policies, including keeping the United States involved in Asia to maintain the current balance, while avoiding an alliance to maintain autonomy, and developing increased military projection capability in order to use hard power.²⁷⁸ Many of the recommendations are more realist in nature, but the avoidance of alliance and the title indicate a level of Nehruvian influence. Thus while not always a guiding principle, Nehruvianism still influences India's foreign policy.

For Japan-India relations, the implications of Nehruvianism are mixed. If Japan is seen as an American ally, those with strong Nehruvian tendencies could want to distance India from Japan. Conversely, Japan's strong anti-nuclear stance and post WWII peaceful reputation could draw these same people to greater ties with Japan. Thus, Nehruvianism would have an ambivalent influence on Indo-Japanese relations; but its waning role in India generally diminishes its impact relative to other drivers of that bilateral interaction.

C. CONCLUSION

Much of India's domestic factors draw it closer to Japan. New Delhi's greater involvement in world affairs and its growing strength have been part of bringing the two

²⁷⁷ "Nehruvian Legacy of Secularism, Socialism Core Beliefs: Sonia Gandhi," *Economic Times*, May 27, 2014, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-05-27/news/50122512_1_congress-president-sonia-gandhi-secularism-rajiv-gandhi.

²⁷⁸ Sunil Khilnani, et al., *Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy For India in the Twenty First Century* (New Delhi: National Defence College, 2012), 12, 32, 38.

countries closer together; moreover, the two share several common goals like those discussed in previous chapters. India and Japan are also both involved in Southeast Asia after India's Look East policy that began in the 1990s. India's attempt to improve its infrastructure along with Japan's willingness to help build India's infrastructure and workforce through ODA, as well as Japanese companies' increased investments, also contributes to India's desire to establish relations. India's political culture, with the influence of Nehru and Gandhi, is more complicated, but has the potential to guide policy makers to strengthen the Japan-India relationship as well if it is framed correctly.

VI. CONCLUSION

This thesis began with the question of whether growing Japan-India relations are transient or building into a new fixture in international affairs. In order to answer this question, the thesis has examined various underlying causes to determine the effect they have had on the relationship over the past 15 years, in order to better understand the motivations behind Tokyo and New Delhi's decision to foster growing ties. This analysis allows some extrapolation of the future course of India-Japan relations depending on changes or continuity in the causal factors.

A. PRIMARY MOTIVATOR

When looking at the various factors that could drive Japan-India relations, the rise of China and subsequent need to create or maintain a balance in the region appears to have taken the dominant role. Balance of power in this case does not mean or require strategic alliances in the vein of NATO and Warsaw Pact. While these kind of alliances could happen, this round of balancing relates more to countries' influence in international institutions, neighboring countries, trade, military might and cooperation, and international opinion. Instead of directly opposing another country, the steps taken to balance to date have been ones to prevent China from becoming a regional hegemon while simultaneously attempting to avoid provoking retaliation, whether diplomatic, economic, or military.

India has been working to balance China for decades; India signed a treaty with the Soviet Union whose main purpose was balancing against China. While other factors were present, India's nuclear program again attempts to balance China's program and its aid to Pakistan's nuclear program. India's Look East policy came after India lost the economic and political support of the USSR and Soviet Bloc, which also meant a loss of balance with China.

Since WWII, Japan did not need to worry about balancing with China, both because its economy and strength grew first and due to the security alliance with the United States. As China rose and Japan's security situation became more tenuous, Japan

began to seek out partners, including Australia and India. China's more vocal stance on issues like the Senkaku/Daiyou Islands, visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and other WWII topics has contributed to Japan's concerns over China and led to a balancing strategy.

B. SECONDARY FACTORS

While the need to establish a balance vis-à-vis China is the primary factor, other factors enabled India and Japan to follow that driver more comfortably. These include Japan and India's increasing activity in world affairs, the lack of animosity between the two countries, and U.S. policy.

Japan and India's separate but similar moves to become more active on the world stage opened the door to greater communication. For India, some of this can be tied to a desire to balance China; however, India would have needed to reach out after the collapse of the Soviet Bloc for economic purposes. Japan, in contrast, began to be more involved in international politics initially in the 1970s with ASEAN. It increased its movement toward greater involvement after the first Gulf War and the criticism it received for its lack of participation. These events happened before Japan-China relations started to decline in the mid-1990s. If India had reached west instead of east, or Japan had remained secluded politically, they may not have been in a position to reach out; conversely, without China Japan would have had fewer incentives to become closer to India.

The second factor that complements balance of power reasoning is the lack of baggage. For Japan, South Korea is much closer, would also be subject to a hegemonic China, has existing strong economic ties, shares a second security threat in North Korea, and is already a U.S. ally. Hence, South Korea would seem to be a natural Japanese ally. However, the historical issues of colonization, including Yasukuni Shrine and comfort women, and the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands territorial dispute have consistently gotten in the way. In contrast, while India may be further away and have fewer ties, it also has fewer complications.

India does not have the same historical problem in the same measure with its nearer potential allies. However, with both China and Pakistan as adversaries, smaller countries like Nepal and Bangladesh have less to contribute to any balancing effort.

Finally, the United States has also played a role in developing Japan-India relations primarily due to its alliance with Japan and recently improved relations with India. With Bill Clinton's initial visit to India in 2000, the United States signaled that it was prepared to work with India and accept India's nuclear program. This gave Prime Minister Mori more maneuvering room with India. If the United States had been harder on India in 1998 and continued to pressure India to drop its nuclear program, Japan would have had less reason to change its own policy of attempting to punish India for its nuclear weapons tests in 1998.

C. TERTIARY AND NEGATIVE FACTORS

Many of the other factors assessed in this thesis have been shown to have not had an impact on India and Japan's strengthening relationship, like economic and cultural ties. Other factors, primarily at the multilateral level, have been influenced by the balance of power calculations in ways that makes it difficult to fully separate the two.

When Japan and India began to foster greater ties, their bilateral trade was shrinking in percentage and their cultural links were small. After 14 years of strengthening the bilateral relationship, these factors haven't changed, even though both governments have taken steps to try and build this part of the relationship. Perhaps Ghosh and Jaiswal are correct in asserting that the lack of these connections has prevented India and Japan from becoming even closer; however, their absence has not prevented the formation of the relationship or its continued growth to this point.

The multilateral engagement of Japan and India, while providing more forums for interaction, has not been a decisive factor. First, the cooperation on UNSC reform has not been a powerful enough magnet, as evidenced by Japan's relations to Brazil and Germany. Second, the maritime security aim and others could also be achieved strictly through the multilateral realm without the growing bilateral ties as Japan has been achieving this with ASEAN. Third, the impetus to balance China can be seen in some of

Japan and India's calculations in these multilateral organizations, including Japan's insistence on India's membership in the EAS.

D. WILD CARD: NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ENERGY

While India's nuclear program initially was a non-starter for a Japan-India partnership, this changed in the two years after the Pokhoran II tests. The change did not go so far as Japan accepting India's nuclear program with open arms, but the importance of the issue dropped significantly. The reasons for this change from major factor to annoyance appear to be Japan's worsening security situation with China's rise, North Korea's nuclear program, increased hostility from South Korea, and the United States' relative decline, and in particular Washington's acceptance of India's nuclear program. These same issues have also opened Japan further to the possibility of some forms of arms exports and cooperation, including the joint development and production of a ballistic missile defense system with the United States and the planned export of the US-2 aircraft to India.

Japan has not, however, given up on the nonproliferation regime. Every year, Japan still puts forth proposals at the UN for disarmament and nonproliferation. Japan also continues to ask India to sign the NPT and CTBT. Finally, Japan and India have yet to come to an agreement on nuclear power cooperation, in part because of Japanese concerns regarding India's nuclear weapons program.

E. FUTURE PROSPECTS

With a desire to balance China's power and influence in the region as the primary factor, the prospects for India-Japan relations appear to rest on China's future behavior. As long as China remains a major regional actor, Japan and India will likely continue to work together and build the relationship. Conversely, if China were to cease to be an issue, Tokyo and New Delhi would have fewer incentives to continue the relationship. There are, however, some important caveats to this argument, including nuclear tests and momentum, and how China may exit the picture.

While Japan has lowered the priority of nuclear nonproliferation when dealing with India, it has remained an issue. Japan and India commenced nuclear negotiations nearly five years ago, and still have not reached an accommodation. One of the sticking points is Japan's insistence that any nuclear-related material exported from Japan is to be returned if India conducts another nuclear test. If India were to conduct another nuclear test, particularly with a renewed antinuclear sentiment among the population after Fukushima, Japan's leaders may be forced to employ another round of punitive action against India due to domestic considerations.

In the opposite direction, if the need to balance China vanished, Japan and India could continue to strengthen their relationship due to the momentum already generated. Japan and India now work together in maritime security, conduct annual exercises, and have signed a comprehensive trade agreement. Japan has also committed to an array of development programs in India, and Japanese companies are continuing to invest in India, creating the potential for greater economic ties than currently exist. Japanese and Indian leaders from divergent political parties have also chosen to maintain the current course on the bilateral relationship. If no event occurs to push the two apart, Japan and India could continue to maintain the relationship's current state. They would however, lose a strong incentive for building the relationship further or maintaining it in the face of adversity.

Finally, the variation in the ways by which China's "rise" might reverse could have a dramatic impact on the direction of future Indo-Japan relations. Any forecasting here is highly problematic as the changes needed to reverse China's rise would be massive or dramatic. Moreover, because of China's size, position in Asia, and growing economy and military, a sudden reversal is highly improbable.

F. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Japan-India relationship will likely continue to grow in the future, as its principal catalyst is reaction to a rising China, which will presumably remain an important player in Asia and the world. This strengthening of Indo-Japanese ties favors the current U.S. strategy in Asia. The United States, as a secondary factor, also has the

ability to encourage the growth of India-Japan relations, including working with both countries bilaterally and trilaterally, as well as encouraging Japan to reach an accommodation in their nuclear power negotiations. Conversely, Washington's options are limited if it wished to prevent closer ties from being built. But current regional circumstances provide little reason for the United States to want to inhibit that relationship.

With balancing China being the primary factor driving Japan and India closer together, both countries (as well as the United States to the extent of its involvement) need to be careful not to unnecessarily antagonize China. This can be done by each country continuing its bilateral engagements with China. Establishing a trilateral relationship between Japan, India, and China, or a quadrilateral relationship including the United States, might also help to lubricate the shifting balances of power in Asia.

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